- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology
- About the Contributors
- What is Philosophical Methodology?
- The Methodology of the History of Philosophy
- Methodology in Nineteenth-and Early Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy
- Nineteenth-Century and Early Twentieth-Century Post-Kantian Philosophy
- Logical Empiricism
- Ordinary Language Philosophy
- Wittgenstein’s Global Deflationism
- Philosophical Naturalism
- Method in Analytic Metaphysics
- The Pragmatic Method
- Reflective Equilibrium
- Analytic–Synthetic and A Priori–A Posteriori History
- Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis
- Philosophical Progress
- Conceivability and Possibility
- Philosophical Heuristics and Philosophical Methodology
- Disagreement in Philosophy: Its Epistemic Significance
- Faith and Reason
- Experimental Philosophy
- Transcendental Arguments
- Physics and Method
- Linguistic and Philosophical Methodology
- History of Ideas: A Defense
- The Methodology of Political Theory
- Philosophy and Psychology
- Logic and Philosophical Methodology
- Philosophy of Mathematics: Issues and Methods
- Methods in the Philosophy of Literature and Film
- Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
- The Methodology of Legal Philosophy
- Critical Philosophy of Race
- Index of Names
Abstract and Keywords
This article examines methodological debates in legal philosophy by focusing on two (related) methodological claims in H. L. A. Hart’s 1961 book, The Concept of Law: that Hart’s theory is both general and descriptive, and an exercise in both linguistic analysis and descriptive sociology. It considers what these claims reveal about Hart’s theoretical ambitions and methodological commitments, and what light they shed on debates in legal philosophy since then. In particular, it discusses the most important elements of Hart’s theory, such as the union of primary and secondary rules in law, the “rule of recognition” as a social rule, and the relationship between legal and moral norms. It also explores several objections to Hart’s approach to the problems of legal philosophy, including one that questions the fruitfulness of the methodology of conceptual analysis. Finally, it analyzes the argument of Hart and all legal positivists that legal systems are social constructs.
Alex Langlinais is currently a student at Student at Yale Law School. He has a MA in Philosophy from the University of Chicago.
Brian Leiter is Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence and Director of the Center for Law, Philosophy and Human Values at the University of Chicago. He is the author of Nietzsche on Morality (Routledge, 2002) and Why Tolerate Religion? (Princeton, 2013), and co-editor of Nietzsche (Oxford Readings in Philosophy, 2001), The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy (2007), and Nietzsche and Morality (Oxford, 2007). His many articles on Nietzsche have appeared in Ethics, Philosopher’s Imprint, Oxford Studies in Metaethics, European Journal of Philosophy and elsewhere.
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