Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 25 February 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This article examines the potential conflict between faith and reason, with emphasis on the relation between beliefs arising from revelation and beliefs arising from reason. It analyses the reasonableness or unreasonableness of faith, focusing on the conditions that make believing what one is told reasonable, or unreasonable, and the sense of reasonable intended when applied to faith. In order to have a method for determining the reasonableness of a belief, it considers two kinds of epistemic reasons: theoretical and deliberative. The chapter argues that trust in ourselves when we are epistemically conscientious is more basic than either theoretical or deliberative reasons, and more basic than any norms of reasoning. It concludes by considering the place of faith in the epistemically conscientious person and suggesting that faith has a component of belief on the word of God which does not conflict with reason directly, but which can be reasonable or unreasonable.

Keywords: faith, reason, belief, revelation, epistemic reasons, theoretical reasons, deliberative reasons, trust, reasoning, word of God

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.