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date: 16 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Early analytic philosophical methodology was dominated by two paradigms. The first, arising from the logicism of Frege and Russell, held that linguistic and logical analyses are tools for answering traditional philosophical questions—for example, What are numbers, material objects, and other minds? and How do we know about them? The answers were that these things are whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them. For Russell, this inspired a conception of logical analysis that led to revisionary metaphysical minimalism in the service of an unexamined conception of knowledge. The second paradigm, stemming from Wittgenstein and Carnap, was based on philosophical theories of the limits of meaningful discourse that excluded most traditional philosophy. G. E. Moore, whose starting point was common-sense knowledge, offered a partial corrective to both paradigms. The era’s most important achievements were the foundations it laid for genuine sciences of language, logic, and information.

Keywords: logic, logicism, logical analysis, metaphysical minimalism, common-sense knowledge, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Moore

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