- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology
- About the Contributors
- What is Philosophical Methodology?
- The Methodology of the History of Philosophy
- Methodology in Nineteenth-and Early Twentieth-Century Analytic Philosophy
- Nineteenth-Century and Early Twentieth-Century Post-Kantian Philosophy
- Logical Empiricism
- Ordinary Language Philosophy
- Wittgenstein’s Global Deflationism
- Philosophical Naturalism
- Method in Analytic Metaphysics
- The Pragmatic Method
- Reflective Equilibrium
- Analytic–Synthetic and A Priori–A Posteriori History
- Philosophical and Conceptual Analysis
- Philosophical Progress
- Conceivability and Possibility
- Philosophical Heuristics and Philosophical Methodology
- Disagreement in Philosophy: Its Epistemic Significance
- Faith and Reason
- Experimental Philosophy
- Transcendental Arguments
- Physics and Method
- Linguistic and Philosophical Methodology
- History of Ideas: A Defense
- The Methodology of Political Theory
- Philosophy and Psychology
- Logic and Philosophical Methodology
- Philosophy of Mathematics: Issues and Methods
- Methods in the Philosophy of Literature and Film
- Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art
- The Methodology of Legal Philosophy
- Critical Philosophy of Race
- Index of Names
Abstract and Keywords
Experimental philosophy is an extension of the Naturalists’ Challenge to the use of intuitions in philosophy. This chapter explores this challenge and traditional or “armchair” responses to it, focusing especially on the case of reference. It first considers the role and nature of intuitions, along with two kinds of experimental philosophical challenges to their use: the challenge from irrelevant determination and the challenge from diversity. It then explores using the challenge from diversity to undermine the reliability of intuitions as evidence for the truth of philosophical claims, and examines critical responses to the challenge from diversity. The chapter concludes by evaluating the possibility that diversity in responses to thought experiments occur even within individuals, and the implications of this for the Naturalists’ Challenge.
Ron Mallon is an associate professor of philosophy and director of the Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program at Washington University in St. Louis. His research is in social philosophy, philosophy of cognitive psychology, and moral psychology. He has authored or coauthored papers in Cognition, Ethics, Journal of Political Philosophy, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Mind and Language, Noûs, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Social Neuroscience, Social Philosophy, and Social Theory and Practice.
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