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date: 26 January 2021

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter argues that John Duns Scotus has several goals in the epistemology of theology: logical consistency, certainty, truth, and right praxis. The first section covers the natural knowledge of God, in which Scotus defends the claim that there are some non-complex univocal concepts, that they can be the building blocks of complex analogical concepts, and that univocal and analogical concepts are applicable to God and to creatures. A genealogy is given of three exegetical mistakes regarding univocity made by some twentieth-century thinkers. The second section covers five ways that one can have supernatural knowledge of God: intuitive cognition, abstractive cognition with the possibility of doubt, abstractive cognition without the opportunity for doubt, biblical exegesis, and faith. The next section discusses the scientific character of theology, and how such knowledge is literally a part of the praxis of loving God. The conclusion discusses how theology can resolve dilemmas in a naturalistic epistemology.

Keywords: John Duns Scotus, epistemology, natural knowledge, supernatural knowledge, God, faith, univocity, analogy, praxis

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