Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 21 May 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter is divided broadly into two parts. The first part examines the idea that agents choose for (motivating) reasons. After an investigation of what this idea amounts to, arguments for the claim the agent always chooses for reasons and for the claim that agents never choose for reasons are set out and critiqued. It is concluded that, at the very least, there are deep problems with the idea that agents choose for reasons. The second part examines what light the relationship between (normative) reasons and responsibility can shed on the nature of reasons. Roughly, it is argued that, given reasons-responsive accounts of responsibility, reasons are best cashed out as being evidence of the normative or evaluative status of actions.

Keywords: reasons, choices, responsibility, evidence, action

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.