- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Regulation and Comparative Corporate Governance
- The History of Corporate Governance
- Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions
- An International Corporate Governance Index
- Boards and Governance: 25 Years of Qualitative Research with Directors of FTSE Companies
- Process Matters: Understanding Board Behavior and Effectiveness
- Board Committees
- The Governance of Director Networks
- Executive Compensation and Corporate Governance: What Do We “Know” and Where Are We Going?
- Corporate Governance: Ownership Interests, Incentives, and Conflicts
- Financial Leverage and Corporate Governance
- Financial Reporting, Disclosure, and Corporate Governance
- Auditing and Corporate Governance
- The Market for Corporate Control
- The Life Cycle of Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in High-Tech Firms
- Family Business and Corporate Governance
- Corporate Governance in IPOs
- Corporate Governance, Multinational Firms, and Internationalization
- Corporate Governance in Business Groups
- Governance in Financial Distress and Bankruptcy
- Venture Capital and Corporate Governance
- Private Equity, Leveraged Buyouts, and Corporate Governance
- Hedge Fund Activism and Corporate Governance
- The Financial Role of Sovereign Wealth Funds
- Corporate Governance and Nonprofits: Facing up to Hybridization and Homogenization
- Corporate Governance and Labor
- Corporate Governance and Principal–Principal Conflicts
- Multiple Agency Theory: An Emerging Perspective on Corporate Governance
- An Age of Corporate Governance Failure?: Financialization and its Limits
- Corporate Governance and Corporate Social Responsibility
Abstract and Keywords
Hedge funds are now considered as a related—and distinctive—form of active investor. This chapter shows how hedge funds have become critical players within the financial market, of which they comprised more than $2 trillion in market value during the last few months of 2011. It discusses the evolution of hedge fund activism, its implications for corporate governance, and the nature of hedge fund activism. It differentiates hedge fund activism from the activism of traditional institutional investors, venture capital funds, and private equity funds. The chapter also studies the short- and long-term effects of hedge fund activism on firm performance, corporate governance, and value.
Na Dai is an assistant professor of finance at State University of New York, Albany. Her research interests include venture capital and private equity, private investments in public equity, hedge funds, and regulations. Her scholarly works have appeared in journals such as Financial Management, Journal of Corporate Finance, Journal of Empirical Finance, and European Financial Management.
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