- Phenomenological method: reflection, introspection, and skepticism
- Transcendental phenomenology and the seductions of naturalism: subjectivity, consciousness, and meaning
- Respecting appearances: a phenomenological approach to consciousness
- On the possibility of naturalizing phenomenology
- The phenomenology of life: desire as the being of the subject
- Intentionality without representationalism
- Perception, context, and direct realism
- Colours and sounds: the field of visual and auditory consciousness
- Bodily intentionality, affectivity, and basic affects
- Thought in action
- Sex, gender, and embodiment
- At the edges of my body
- Action and selfhood: a narrative interpretation
- Self-consciousness and World-consciousness
- Self, consciousness, and shame
- The (many) foundations of knowledge
- The phenomenological foundations of predicative structure
- Language and non-linguistic thinking
- Sharing in truth: phenomenology of epistemic commonality
- Responsive ethics
- Towards a phenomenology of the political world
- Other people
- Experience and history
- The forgiveness of time and consciousness
- Hermeneutical phenomenology
- Something that is nothing but can be anything: the image and our consciousness of it
- Phenomenological and aesthetic <i>epoché</i>: painting the invisible things themselves
- Evidence in the phenomenology of religious experience
Abstract and Keywords
This paper introduces phenomenology as a distinctive form of transcendental philosophy by exploring a problem that arises with the phenomenological concept of “constitution,” namely, the “paradox of human subjectivity” – the idea that under the transcendental reduction the human subject is both a (constituted) entity in the world and the ground of all such constitution. Focusing on the question of what conditions must obtain for something to be the bearer of normatively structured intentional content (i.e., meaning/Sinn), the paper argues that the appearance of paradox here rests upon a certain naturalistic assumption – namely, that the aspect of subjectivity responsible for transcendental constitution is consciousness conceived as the kind of phenomenal experience we share with other animals. In a final section I try to suggest how transcendentalism and a certain naturalism might nevertheless be reconciled on phenomenological grounds.
Steven Crowell is Joseph and Joanna Nazro Mullen Professor of Philosophy at Rice University. He is the author of numerous articles on phenomenology and of Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Phenomenology (2001). He is editor of The Cambridge Companion to Existentialism (2012) and, with Jeff Malpas, Transcendental Heidegger (2007). He has served as Executive Co-Director of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy, and is currently co-editor of Husserl Studies.
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