Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 16 July 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter considers the epistemology of John Henry Newman, arguing that it has merits which are quite independent of the religious purpose that was his overarching aim in developing it. For Newman, epistemology was part of ‘psychology’ which, like Frege, he separated off from logic. Dissenting from Locke’s view that there are degrees of assent, Newman’s main concern was to argue that assent on evidence short of intuition or demonstration may well be legitimate, and frequently is so. For Newman certitude is indefectible; If we are certain of a belief, we resolve to maintain it and we spontaneously reject as idle any objections to it. The chapter concludes with a consideration of Newman’s view of religious faith.

Keywords: Newman, Frege, Locke, assent, faith

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.