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date: 06 April 2020

Abstract and Keywords

In this article the authors propose a comparative-institutional theoretical framework for analyzing policy delegation in the American states. The novel aspect of this theoretical framework is centered on a comparative analysis of the institutional capacities possessed by the legislature, chief executive (governor), and bureaucracy. This theoretical framework is undergirded by an assumption that institutions seek to maximize administrative policy control, subject to their relative endowments of institutional capacity. That is, although both partisan and ideological preferences are critical for determining policy outcomes, they are either constrained or empowered by institutions’ capacity for policymaking.

Keywords: bureaucracy, policymaking, delegation, institutions, governor, legislature, capacity, administration, policy control, capacity

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