- Notes on the Contributors
- Methods in Bioethics
- The Way We Reason Now: Reflective Equilibrium in Bioethics
- Mental Disorder, Moral Agency, and the Self
- ‘Reinventing’ the Rule of Double Effect
- Policy‐Making in Pluralistic Societies
- Tiers Without Tears: the Ethics of a Two‐Tier Health Care System
- Justice and the Elderly
- Organ Transplantation
- For Dignity or Money: Feminists on the Commodification of Women's Reproductive Labour
- The Definition of Death
- The Aging Society and the Expansion of Senility: Biotechnological and Treatment Goals
- Death is a Punch in the Jaw: Life‐Extension and its Discontents
- Precedent Autonomy, Advance Directives, and End‐of‐Life Care
- Physician‐Assisted Death: the State of the Debate
- Abortion Revisited
- Moral Status, Moral Value, and Human Embryos: Implications for Stem Cell Research
- Therapeutic Cloning: Politics and Policy
- Population Genetic Research and Screening: Conceptual and Ethical Issues
- Genetic Interventions and The Ethics of Enhancement of Human Beings
- Pharmacogenomics: Ethical and Regulatory Issues
- Clinical Equipoise: Foundational Requirement or Fundamental Error?
- Research on Cognitively Impaired Adults
- Research in Developing Countries
- Animal Experimentation
- The Implications of Public Health for Bioethics
- Global Health
- Bioethics and Bioterrorism
Abstract and Keywords
The three major classical accounts of the morality of abortion are all subject to at least one major problem. Can we do better? This article aims to discuss three accounts that purport to be superior to the classical accounts. First, it discusses the future of value argument for the immorality of abortion. It defends the claim that the future of value argument is superior to all three of the classical accounts. It then goes on to discuss Warren's attempt to fix up her personhood account and David Boonin's attempt to fix up Tooley's desire account. Warren claims that her updated version of a personhood account is superior to any potentiality account, such as the future of value account. The article evaluates her claim. Boonin argues that his improved desire view both deals adequately with the apparent counterexamples to Tooley's original account and also is superior to the future of value account. The article evaluates his views as well.
Don Marquis is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Kansas. He is the author of a widely reprinted and widely discussed essay on the ethics of abortion that was published in 1989. He has written a number of essays on the ethics of abortion since that time
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