- The Oxford Handbook of Truth
- Acknowledgments
- List of contributors
- Introduction
- Plato and Aristotle on Truth and Falsehood
- Truth in the Middle Ages
- Early Modern Theories of Truth
- Idealism and the Question of Truth
- Truth in British Idealism and its Analytic Critics
- Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey
- Truth in Frege
- The Coherence Theory of Truth
- The Correspondence Theory of Truth
- The Identity Theory of Truth
- The Pragmatist Theory of Truth
- Propositions and Truth-Bearers
- Truthmakers
- A Logical Theory of Truth-Makers and Falsity-Makers
- Bivalence and Determinacy
- Truth, Objectivity, and Realism
- Deflationist Truth
- Truth in Fictionalism
- Relative Truth
- Truth Pluralism
- The Moral Truth
- Truth and the Sciences
- Truth and Truthlikeness
- Truth in Mathematics
- Semantic Paradoxes: A Psychohistory of Self-Defeat
- Tarski on the Concept of Truth
- The Axiomatic Approach to Truth
- Non-Classical Theories of Truth
- Contextual Theories of Truth and Paradox
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
The coherence theory holds that truth consists in coherence amongst our beliefs. It can thus rule out radical scepticism and avoid the problems of the correspondence theory. Considerations about meaning and verification have also pointed philosophers in the same direction. But if it holds all truth to consist in coherence it is untenable: there must be some truths that do not, truths about what people believe. This causes problems for traditional coherence theories, and also for verificationists and anti-realists. The admission of a grounding class of truths that do not consist in coherence also raises the question why there should be such systematic agreement between these. This cannot properly be explained by anything that is said within the theory whose truth is constituted by coherence with the grounding class. Kant saw this problem, and postulated “things as they are in themselves.” Others dismiss it; but that is not satisfactory.
Keywords: truth, coherence, verificationism, anti-realism, Dummett, Kant
Ralph C. S. Walker, Emeritus Fellow in Philosophy of Magdalen College, Oxford
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- The Oxford Handbook of Truth
- Acknowledgments
- List of contributors
- Introduction
- Plato and Aristotle on Truth and Falsehood
- Truth in the Middle Ages
- Early Modern Theories of Truth
- Idealism and the Question of Truth
- Truth in British Idealism and its Analytic Critics
- Judgments, Facts, and Propositions: Theories of Truth in Russell, Wittgenstein, and Ramsey
- Truth in Frege
- The Coherence Theory of Truth
- The Correspondence Theory of Truth
- The Identity Theory of Truth
- The Pragmatist Theory of Truth
- Propositions and Truth-Bearers
- Truthmakers
- A Logical Theory of Truth-Makers and Falsity-Makers
- Bivalence and Determinacy
- Truth, Objectivity, and Realism
- Deflationist Truth
- Truth in Fictionalism
- Relative Truth
- Truth Pluralism
- The Moral Truth
- Truth and the Sciences
- Truth and Truthlikeness
- Truth in Mathematics
- Semantic Paradoxes: A Psychohistory of Self-Defeat
- Tarski on the Concept of Truth
- The Axiomatic Approach to Truth
- Non-Classical Theories of Truth
- Contextual Theories of Truth and Paradox
- Index