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date: 24 February 2021

Abstract and Keywords

What does realism about an arbitrary subject-matter have to do with truth? Some views say everything, others hardly anything. Both answers are reflected in ongoing debates between self-styled realists and anti-realists in metaphysics, and other areas. Error theory, nonfactualism, fictionalism, and other forms of opposition to realism are normally articulated and differentiated using the notions of truth and falsity. Given its preoccupation with the limits of literal representation, fictionalism can seem especially ensared in semantics and/or the theory of mental content. Be that as it may, the present chapter aims to establish that there remains an important sense in which the fictionalist gambit does not essentially have anything to do with truth or falsity. In particular, many recognizably fictionalist positions are compatible with nominalism about truths: the view that nothing whatsoever is true.

Keywords: truth, realism, anti-realism, fiction, fictionalism, nominalism

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