- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language
- List of Contributors
- Frege's Contribution to Philosophy of Language
- Wittgenstein on Language: From Simples to Samples
- Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century
- Language as Internal
- Languages and Idiolects: Their Language and Ours
- Rule‐Following, Meaning, and Normativity
- Naturalist Theories of Meaning
- Truth and Meaning
- Meaning Holism
- Indeterminacy of Translation
- Intention‐Based Semantics
- Propositional Content
- Conceptual Role Semantics
- Semantic Internalism and Externalism
- Relevance Theory—New Directions and Developments
- The Distinction between Semantics and Pragmatics
- The Essence of Reference
- Predicate Reference
- Names and Natural Kind Terms
- What Does it Take to Refer?
- Formal Semantics
- Two‐Dimensional Semantics
- The Pragmatics of the Logical Constants
- Logical Form and LF
- Semantics for Nondeclaratives
- Speech Acts and Performatives
- Meaning and Reference: Some Chomskian Themes
- What I Know When I Know a Language
- Realism and Antirealism
- Shared Content
- The Perils and Pleasures of Interpretation
Abstract and Keywords
Conceptual role semantics (CRS) is the view that the meanings of expressions of a language (or other symbol system) or the contents of mental states are determined or explained by the role of the expressions or mental states in thinking. The theory can be taken to be applicable to language in the ordinary sense, to mental representations, conceived of either as symbols in a ‘language of thought’ or as mental states such as beliefs, or to certain other sorts of symbol systems. CRS rejects the competing idea that thoughts have intrinsic content that is prior to the use of concepts in thought. According to CRS, meaning and content derive from use, not the other way round.
Mark Greenberg, University of California, Los Angeles
Gilbert Harman is Stuart Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Committee for Cognitive Science at Princeton University. He is the author of Explaining Value (2000) and Reasoning, Meaning, and Mind (1999), and coauthor with Judith Jarvis Thomson of Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity (1996).
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