- List of contributors
- Introduction: A Diversity of Selves
- History as Prologue: Western Theories of the Self
- What is it Like to be a Newborn?
- Self in the Brain
- The Embodied Self
- Bodily Awareness and Self‐Consciousness
- The Sense of Body Ownership
- Phenomenological Dimensions of Bodily Self‐Consciousness
- Witnessing from Here: Self-Awareness from a Bodily versus Embodied Perspective
- The Minimal Subject
- The No‐Self Alternative
- Buddhist Non‐Self: The No‐Owner's Manual
- Unity of Consciousness and the Problem of Self
- Personal Identity
- On What we are
- On Knowing one's Self
- The Narrative Self
- The Unimportance of Identity
- Self‐Control in Action
- Moral Responsibility and the Self
- The Structure of Self‐Consciousness in Schizophrenia
- Multiple Selves
- Autism and the Self
- The Self: Growth, Integrity, and Coming Apart
- Our Glassy Essence: The Fallible Self in Pragmatist Thought
- The Social Construction of Self
- The Dialogical Self: A Process of Positioning in Space and Time
- Glass Selves: Emotions, Subjectivity, and the Research Process
- The Postmodern Self: An Essay on Anachronism and Powerlessness
- Self, Subjectivity, and the Instituted Social Imaginary
Abstract and Keywords
This article describes a neo-Aristotelian conception of self-control, a concept that seems essential to what it means to be a mature human person. It discusses the moral condition known as akrasia and the conception of self that underpins it. While Aristotle regarded the human self to be primarily rational where reason is taken in a strong sense, this article suggests a more holistic conception of the self, where to act out of passion may not mean that one is acting without self-control. This means that the kind of inner conflict associated with akrasia should not be explained purely in terms of rational versus irrational forces.
Alfred R. Mele is the William H. and Lucyle T. Werkmeister Professor of Philosophy at Florida State University and director of the Big Questions in Free Will Project (2010–13). He is the author of Irrationality (1987), Springs of Action (OUP, 1992), Autonomous Agents (1995), Self-Deception Unmasked (2001), Motivation and Agency (OUP, 2003), Free Will and Luck (OUP, 2006), and Effective Intentions: The Power of Conscious Will (OUP, 2009). He also is the editor or coeditor of The Philosophy of Action (1997), Mental Causation (1993), The Oxford Handbook of Rationality (OUP, 2004), Rationality and the Good (2007), and Free Will and Consciousness: How Might They Work? (2010).
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