- Oxford Handbooks in Linguistics
- List of Abbreviations
- The Contributors
- Compositionality: Its Historic Context
- Composition A Lity In Montague Grammar
- The case for compositionality
- Compositionality Problems and how to Solve Them
- Direct Compositionality
- Semantic Monadicity with Conceptual Polyadicity
- Holism And Compositionality.
- Composition Ality, Flexibility, And Context Dependence
- Compositionality in Kaplan Style Semantics
- Formalizing the relationship between meaning and syntax
- Compositionality and The Context Principle
- Compositionality In Discourse From A Logical Perspective
- Lexical Decomposition In Grammar
- Lexical Decomposition in Modern Syntactic Theory
- Syntax in the Atom
- Co-composition Ality in Grammar
- Typicality and Composition a Lity: the Logic of Combining Vague Concepts
- Emergency!!!! Challenges to a Compositional Understanding of Noun–noun Combinations
- Can Prototype Representations Support Composition And Decomposition?
- Regaining Composure: A Defence Of Prototype Compositionality.
- Simple Heuristics For Concept Combination
- Compositionality and Beyond: Embodied Meaning in Language and Protolanguage
- Compositionality and Linguistic Evolution
- Communication And The complexity of semantics
- Prototypes and their Composition from an Evolutionary Point of View
- Connectionism, Dynamical Cognition, and Non-Classical Compositional Representation
- The Dual-Mechanism Debate
- Compositionality and Biologically Plausible Models
- Neuronal Assembly Models of Compositionality
- Non-Symbolic Compositional Representation and Its Neuronal Foundation: To wards An Emulative Semantics
- The Processing Consequences of Compositionality
Abstract and Keywords
This article addresses the issue of compositionality of mental representations from the perspective of a foundational framework for cognitive science. The dynamical cognition framework (DC framework) is inspired partially by connectionism and partially by the persistence of the problem of relevance within classical computational cognitive science. It treats cognition in terms of the mathematics of dynamical systems: total occurrent cognitive states are mathematically/structurally realized as points in a high-dimensional dynamical system, and these mathematical points are physically realized by total-activation states of a neural network with specific connection weights. The framework repudiates the classicist assumption that cognitive-state transitions conform to a tractably computable transition function over cognitive states. Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) states that the causal role of a mental representation is syntactically determined, but this idea of syntactic determination of causal role is ambiguous.
Terry Horgan has been Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona since 2002. He writes articles in metaphysics, epistemology, mind, and metaethics. His publications include, with J. Tienson, Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology (MIT Press, 1996) and, with M. Potrc, Austere Realism: Contextual Semantics Meets Minimal Ontol-ogy (MIT, 2008).
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