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date: 24 September 2020

Abstract and Keywords

This chapter examines the economics literature on tacit collusion in oligopoly markets and take steps toward clarifying the relation between economists’ analysis of tacit collusion and those in the legal literature. The chapter provides an example to motivate the idea that collusive profits can be achieved via tacit coordination in an environment where there is a unique, salient way for colluders to maximize and distribute their joint profits. It also surveys the obstacles to obtaining above-competitive profits in less straightforward environments without having recourse to explicit communication.

Keywords: cartel, price fixing, agreement, folk theorem, tacit collusion

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