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date: 22 November 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Virtue consequentialism is the view that whether a character trait is a virtue or a vice depends on the value of its consequences. This chapter first briefly traces the historical development of virtue consequentialism from John Locke through G. E. Moore and spells out the different ways in which the view has been formulated. It is argued that the best version of virtue consequentialism is a scalar, contrastive version according to which there are no absolute facts about which character traits are virtues. The chapter then examines arguments in favor of virtue consequentialism by Julia Driver, such as the argument that there are virtues of ignorance, and arguments against by Michael Slote, Robert Adams, and Todd Calder.

Keywords: virtue, consequentialism, character, trait, John Locke, G. E. Moore

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