- The Oxford Handbook of Indian Philosophy
- Introduction: Why Indian Philosophy? Why Now?
- Interpreting Indian Philosophy: Three Parables
- History and Doxography of the Philosophical Schools
- Philosophy as a Distinct Cultural Practice: The Transregional Context
- Comparison or Confluence In Philosophy?
- Nāgārjuna on Emptiness: A Comprehensive Critique of Foundationalism
- Philosophical Quietism in Nāgārjuna and Early Madhyamaka
- Habit and Karmic Result in the <i>Yogaśāstra</i>
- Vasubandhu on the Conditioning Factors and the Buddha’s Use of Language
- Buddhaghosa on the Phenomenology of Love and Compassion
- The Philosophy of Mind of Kundakunda and Umāsvāti
- Vātsyāyana: Cognition as a Guide to Action
- Bharthari on Language, Perception, and Consciousness
- Coreference and Qualification: Dignāga Debated by Kumārila and Dharmakīrti
- Reflexive Awareness and No-Self: Dignāga Debated by Uddyotakara & Dharmakīrti
- The Metaphysics of Self in Praśastapāda’s Differential Naturalism
- Proving Idealism Dharmakīrti
- Śāntideva’s Impartialist Ethics
- A History of Materialism From Ajita to Udbhaṭa
- Consciousness and Causal Emergence: Śāntarakṣita Against Physicalism
- Pushing Idealism Beyond its Limits: The Place of Philosophy in Kamalaśīla’s Steps of Cultivation
- Jayarāśi Against the Philosophers
- Two Theories of Motivation and Their Assessment by Jayanta
- Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta on the Freedom of Consciousness
- The Nature of Idealism in the <i>Mokṣopāyaśāstra/Yogavāsiṣṭha</i>
- Logic in the Tradition of Prabhācandra
- An Indian Philosophy of Law: Vijñāneśvara’s Epitome of the Law
- Śrīharṣa’s Dissident Epistemology: Of Knowledge as Assurance
- A Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge in Gaṅgeśa
- Jayatīrtha and the Problem of Perceptual Illusion
- Mādhava’s <i>Garland of Jaimini’s Reasons</i> as Exemplary Mīmāṃsā Philosophy
- Hindu Disproofs of God: Refuting Vedāntic Theism in the Sāṃkhya-Sūtra
- Raghunātha Śiromaṇi and the <i>Examination of the Truth about the Categories</i>
- Nīlakaṇṭha Caturdhara’s Advaita Vedānta
- Muḥibb Allāh Ilāhābādī on Ontology: Debates Over the Nature of Being
- Jawaharlal Nehru, Mohandas Gandhi, and the Contexts of Indian Secularism
- Freedom in Thinking: The Immersive Cosmopolitanism of Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya
- Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar’s Modern Moral Idealism: A Metaphysics of Emancipation
- Anukul Chandra Mukerji: The Modern Subject
Abstract and Keywords
Nāgārjuna, who founded the school known as Philosophy of the Middle, or Madhyamaka, was an important South Indian Buddhist philosopher who flourished in the second century ce. His writings, as well as those of Āryadeva and the Nāgārjunian commentators, promote a certain type of irenic philosophy or quietism. The particularity of the Madhyamaka is that it emphasizes philosophical analysis as a method leading to quietening of thought. A complex issue is whether Nāgārjuna’s quietism should be seen as a type of anti-intellectualism or sophistical refusal to take responsibility for one’s views. I examine three contemporary interpretations of his claim to have no thesis of his own, and a variety of interpretations of his quietism. I argue that his quietism should be understood as a type of vigilance.
Tom J. F. Tillemans holds the Chair of Buddhist Studies at the University of Lausanne in Switzerland. His initial training was in analytic philosophy, with a second training in Sanskrit, Tibetan, and Chinese. Published work has been in Buddhist Madhyamaka and epistemology, with an increasing emphasis on issues of comparative philosophy.
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