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date: 14 October 2019

Abstract and Keywords

Dualism in contemporary philosophy of mind comes in many different varieties, but following long-standing tradition is normally divided into two main kinds: substance dualism and property dualism, the former maintaining the distinctness of mental and physical substances and the latter maintaining the distinctness of mental and physical properties. By a substance, in this context, is standardly meant an individual object, or bearer of properties, not a kind of stuff. However, much of the contemporary debate concerning dualism in fact focuses on the relationship between mental and physical events or states, largely because it is these that are commonly supposed to be the relata of causal relations and causal considerations play a very important role in that debate. This might lead one to suppose that a third main kind of dualism should be recognized, namely event or state dualism, maintaining the distinctness of mental and physical events or states.

Keywords: dualism, contemporary philosophy, substance dualism, property dualism, mental substances, individual object

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