- List of Contributors
- Mental Causation
- The Causal Closure of the Physical and Naturalism
- Anomalous Monism
- Non‐Reductive Materialism
- What is Property Physicalism?
- What is the Physical?
- Higher‐Order Theories of Consciousness
- Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- Sensory Qualities, Sensible Qualities, Sensational Qualities
- The Explanatory Gap
- Phenomenal Concepts
- The Two‐Dimensional Argument Against Materialism
- Intentional Systems Theory
- Wide Content
- Narrow Content
- Information‐Theoretic Semantics
- A Measurement‐Theoretic Account of Propositional Attitudes
- The Normativity of the Intentional
- Concepts and Possession Conditions
- The Distinction Between Conceptual and Nonconceptual Content
- The Content of Perceptual Experience
- Phenomenology, Intentionality, and the Unity of the Mind
- The Self
- Unity of Consciousness
- Personal Identity and Metaphysics
- Language and Thought
- Consciousness and Reference
- Emotions: Motivating Feelings
- Intention and Intentional Action
- Folk Psychology
- Other Minds
- Semantic Externalism and Self‐Knowledge
Abstract and Keywords
When one focuses on words on a monitor and, say, feels a twinge of pain, one is not conscious of the words and, separately, of the pain. One is conscious of the words and the pain together, as aspects of a single experience. At least since Kant, this phenomenon has been called the unity of consciousness. A variety of approaches to characterizing unified consciousness have been tried by different theorists. Some start from the idea that a unified conscious experience is a composite of other experiences. Others assert or assume that, while a unified conscious experience will have a complex object or content, it has no experiential parts. This article returns to this disagreement. The first two ways of characterizing the unity of consciousness that are examined here are within the experiential-parts approach.
Paul Raymont is Assistant Professor, Ryerson University.
Andrew Brook is Chancellor's Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Institute of Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Carleton University.
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