- the oxford handbooks of American Politics
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- List of Abbreviations
- About the Contributors
- A Heritage Made Our Own
- Historical Institutionalism, Political Development, and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- The “First New Federalism” and the Development of the Administrative State, 1883–1929
- A Gendered Legacy?: The Progressive Reform Era Revisited
- Reevaluating Executive‐Centered Public Administrative Theory
- Metaphors and the Development of American Bureaucracy
- Herbert Hoover's Revenge: Politics, Policy, and Administrative Reform Movements
- Agency Theory and the Bureaucracy
- Agency Design and Evolution
- Goal Ambiguity and the Study of American Bureaucracy
- Street‐Level Bureaucracy Theory
- The Promises and Paradoxes of Performance‐Based Bureaucracy
- Leading Through Cultural Change
- Postmodernism, Bureaucracy, and Democracy
- Myths, Markets, and the <i>Visible Hand</i> of American Bureaucracy
- Networking in the Shadow of Bureaucracy
- The Promises, Performance, and Pitfalls of Government Contracting
- Reluctant Partners?: Nonprofit Collaboration, Social Entrepreneurship, and Leveraged Volunteerism
- Policy Tools, Mandates, and Intergovernmental Relations
- Promises, Perils, and Performance of Netcentric Bureaucracy
- Multilevel Methods in the Study of Bureaucracy
- Legislative Delegation of Authority to Bureaucratic Agencies
- “Presidentializing” the Bureaucracy
- Bureaucracy, Democracy, and Judicial Review
- Interest Groups, Rulemaking, and American Bureaucracy
- Policymaking, Bureaucratic Discretion, and Overhead Democracy
- Choice‐Theoretic Approaches to Bureaucratic Structure
- Has Governance Eclipsed Government?
- Revitalizing Human Resources Management
- Representative Bureaucracy
- Innovations in Budgeting and Financial Management
- The Prospects for Revitalizing Ethics in a New Governance Era
- Experimental Methods, Agency Incentives, and the Study of Bureaucratic Behavior
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article explores the key attributes of applying experimental methods to the study of bureaucracy. It engages in experimental research on incentives, structure, and other fundamental questions about bureaucracy. Next, it addresses two of the most prominent criticisms of experimental research on American bureaucracies: they lack external validity, and they cannot create laboratory environments that replicate organizational settings. While both pose knotty problems for any experimental research, each has special wrinkles in the case of experimental research on bureaucracy at both the individual and organizational levels. Is also important to note that field experiments suffer from a type of effect that is addressed most concretely in the case of laboratory experiments: the experimenter effect. The experimental approach applied to surveys may be less useful in the case of surveying real bureaucrats. The article finally covers several promising future possibilities for experimental research on American bureaucracy.
Gary J. Miller is Professor of Political Science at Washington University in St. Louis.
Andrew B. Whitford is Professor in the Department of Public Administration and Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, University of Georgia.
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