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date: 04 August 2020

Abstract and Keywords

The tradition of analytic philosophy has many concerns, but one theme is clearly deep and central. Philosophy in this tradition is about meaning, the analysis of meaning. Meaning is expressed in language, and modern logic articulates structures of language that carry meaning (however conceived—intensionally, extensionally, pragmatically). Where we see the role of meaning analysis in the history of analytic philosophy, we should see the role of phenomenology in that history. While logical theory dominated much of analytic philosophy in the first half of the twentieth century, philosophy of mind has dominated much of analytic philosophy in the latter part of the twentieth century. This chapter explores the historical and conceptual trail of phenomenology in what came to be called analytic philosophy. It also compares Edmund Husserl’s programme vis-à-vis Gottlob Frege’s, intentionality vis-à-vis reference, language vis-à-vis mind, meaning, phenomenology in logical empiricism, Rudolf Carnap vis-à-vis Husserl, truth and modality, subjectivity, and self-consciousness.

Keywords: analytic philosophy, phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, Gottlob Frege, intentionality, reference, meaning, logical empiricism, Rudolf Carnap, self-consciousness

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