- About the Authors
- Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology
- The Thing Called Emotion
- Describing the Forms of Emotional Colouring that Pervade Everyday Life
- The Mind's Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science
- Emotions in Plato and Aristotle
- Stoicism and Epicureanism
- Emotions in Medieval Thought
- A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain
- Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre
- Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from the History of Psychopathology
- Emotional Choice and Rational Choice
- Why Be Emotional?
- Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo‐Jamesian Accounts
- Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear
- The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life
- Saying It
- Epistemic Emotions
- Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions
- A Plea for Ambivalence
- Emotion, Self‐/Other‐Awareness, and Autism: A Developmental Perspective
- Emotions and Values
- An Ethics of Emotion?
- The Moral Emotions
- Learning Emotions and Ethics
- Emotions and the Canons of Evaluation
- Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect
- Expression in the Arts
- Affects in Appreciation
- Emotional Responses to Music: What Are They? How Do They Work? And Are They Relevant to Aesthetic Appreciation?
- Emotions, Art, and Immorality
Abstract and Keywords
Philosophers have recently appropriated the anthropologist's distinction between so-called “guilt-centered” and “shame-centered” moral practices to tell a dubious tale about some of the affective attitudes that play a crucial role in our moral assessments, and about the place that these attitudes held in early modern moral theories. The historical part of this story runs as follows. Certain emotional attitudes—disdain, shame, and contempt—are said to have a natural home in the kind of virtue and spectator-centered moral theories proffered by Hume and his sentimentalist contemporaries. In contrast, we are told, guilt, resentment, and indignation have a natural home in act and agent-centered theories like those of Kant and his descendants.
Kate Abramson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Indiana University. She specializes in early modern philosophy and contemporary ethics, with a particular focus on Hume's ethics. Her publications have appeared in Philosophical Studies, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, as well as other journals and numerous collections. At the time of going to press, she was in the final stages of completing a monograph on the evolution of Hume's ethics over the course of his lifetime entitled The Artifice of Nature in Hume's Moral Philosophy: From Philosopher to Reflective Man.
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