- About the Authors
- Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology
- The Thing Called Emotion
- Describing the Forms of Emotional Colouring that Pervade Everyday Life
- The Mind's Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science
- Emotions in Plato and Aristotle
- Stoicism and Epicureanism
- Emotions in Medieval Thought
- A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain
- Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre
- Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from the History of Psychopathology
- Emotional Choice and Rational Choice
- Why Be Emotional?
- Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo‐Jamesian Accounts
- Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear
- The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life
- Saying It
- Epistemic Emotions
- Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions
- A Plea for Ambivalence
- Emotion, Self‐/Other‐Awareness, and Autism: A Developmental Perspective
- Emotions and Values
- An Ethics of Emotion?
- The Moral Emotions
- Learning Emotions and Ethics
- Emotions and the Canons of Evaluation
- Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect
- Expression in the Arts
- Affects in Appreciation
- Emotional Responses to Music: What Are They? How Do They Work? And Are They Relevant to Aesthetic Appreciation?
- Emotions, Art, and Immorality
Abstract and Keywords
This article argues that the asymmetries involved cannot all straightforwardly be attributed to a neat distinction between fact and fiction. Furthermore, the narrative artistry that is often concerned with soliciting empathy and sympathy can facilitate the suspension of moral judgement, norms, and values. Works often solicit the suspension of particular moral assumptions in order to explore imaginatively different ways of seeing, feeling, responding to, and valuing the world. Finally, it is suggested that the complex inter-relations between the evaluation of our emotional responses to what we imagine, our own character, and the moral character of works of art is more complex than is commonly assumed, and future directions for research are suggested.
Matthew Kieran, Department of Philosophy, University of Leeds, England
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