- About the Authors
- Concepts of Emotions in Modern Philosophy and Psychology
- The Thing Called Emotion
- Describing the Forms of Emotional Colouring that Pervade Everyday Life
- The Mind's Bermuda Triangle: Philosophy of Emotions and Empirical Science
- Emotions in Plato and Aristotle
- Stoicism and Epicureanism
- Emotions in Medieval Thought
- A Sentimentalist's Defense of Contempt, Shame, and Disdain
- Emotions in Heidegger and Sartre
- Reinstating the Passions: Arguments from the History of Psychopathology
- Emotional Choice and Rational Choice
- Why Be Emotional?
- Emotions and Motivation: Reconsidering Neo‐Jamesian Accounts
- Emotion, Motivation, and Action: The Case of Fear
- The Phenomenology of Mood and the Meaning of Life
- Saying It
- Epistemic Emotions
- Intellectual and Other Nonstandard Emotions
- A Plea for Ambivalence
- Emotion, Self‐/Other‐Awareness, and Autism: A Developmental Perspective
- Emotions and Values
- An Ethics of Emotion?
- The Moral Emotions
- Learning Emotions and Ethics
- Emotions and the Canons of Evaluation
- Demystifying Sensibilities: Sentimental Values and the Instability of Affect
- Expression in the Arts
- Affects in Appreciation
- Emotional Responses to Music: What Are They? How Do They Work? And Are They Relevant to Aesthetic Appreciation?
- Emotions, Art, and Immorality
Abstract and Keywords
This article starts with some general points about fear. After that, it spells out and discusses the thesis of motivational modularity. However, even though that thesis is plausible in cases of non-human fear, this is not so for human fear. This is why the article turns to the claim that fear comes with some specific desire instead. The last section discusses the thesis of motivational egoism. It argues that when we experience fear for someone else, the motivation involved is exactly as altruistic as when we feel compassion for that person.
Christine Tappolet is Canada Research Chair in Ethics and Meta‐ethics and Full Professor in the Philosophy Department at the Université de Montréal. Her research interests lie mainly in meta‐ethics, normative ethics, moral psychology, and emotion theory. She has edited a number of volumes, including, with Sarah Stroud, Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality (Oxford University Press 2003), and, with Luc Faucher, The Modularity of Emotions (Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supp. vol. 32, 2008). She is the author of Émotions et valeurs (Presses Universitaires de France 2000), and co‐author with Ruwen Ogien of Les Concepts de l'éthique. Faut‐il être conséquentialiste? (Hermann Éditeurs 2008).
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