- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
Conscious thought has been neglected, but it has not been entirely overlooked. Discussion of the topic has focused on three sets of questions. The first set of questions focuses on the kinds of states (events, episodes) that qualify as forms of conscious thought. What might a taxonomy of conscious thought look like? A second set of questions concerns the kind(s) of consciousness that characterizes thought. Are thoughts conscious in the same fundamental way that other mental phenomena are, or is ‘cognitive consciousness’—that is, the consciousness associated with thought—sui generis? A third set of questions concerns the relationship between consciousness and thought. Is consciousness essential to thought, or is it an accidental and contingent feature of thought—a feature that some thoughts possess but others lack? This chapter provides an opinionated point of entry into these and other questions.
Tim Bayne completed an undergraduate degree in Philosophy and Religious Studies at the University of Otago (New Zealand), and a PhD in Philosophy at the University of Arizona. He has taught at Macquarie University, the University of Western Ontario, the University of Manchester, and the University of Oxford. He is currently Professor of Philosophy at Monash University, Melbourne Australia. He is an editor of The Oxford Companion to Consciousness and the author of The Unity of Consciousness (Oxford 2010), Thought: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 2013), and Philosophy of Religion: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford 2018).
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