- Copyright Page
- List of Contributors
- Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Consciousness?
- The Problem of Consciousness
- Visual Experience
- Non-Visual Perception
- Bodily Feelings: Presence, Agency, and Ownership
- Emotional Experience: Affective Consciousness and its Role in Emotion Theory
- Imaginative Experience
- Conscious Thought
- The Experience of Agency
- Temporal Consciousness
- The Phenomenal Unity of Consciousness
- The Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Beyond the Neural Correlates of Consciousness
- Dualism: How Epistemic Issues Drive Debates about the Ontology of Consciousness
- Russellian Monism
- Idealism: Putting Qualia To Work
- Eliminativism About Consciousness
- A Priori Physicalism
- A Posteriori Physicalism: Type-B Materialism and the Explanatory Gap
- Representationalism about Consciousness
- Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness
- Self-Representationalist Theories of Consciousness
- The Epistemic Approach to the Problem of Consciousness
- Consciousness and Attention
- Consciousness and Memory
- Consciousness and Action: Contemporary Empirical Arguments for Epiphenomenalism
- Consciousness and Intentionality
- Consciousness and Knowledge
- Consciousness, Introspection, and Subjective Measures
- Consciousness and Selfhood: Getting Clearer on For-Me-Ness and Mineness
- Consciousness and Morality
- Embodied Consciousness
Abstract and Keywords
The English word ‘attention’ can be used loosely. As a tactic for preventing an enquiry into attention’s relationship to consciousness from lapsing into ill-definition, we shall treat ‘attention’ as a term to be defined by the role that is assigned to it in our explanations of empirically established psychological phenomena (especially those involving the modulation of reaction times). We will review evidence that shows that such modulations are associated with processing that stands in various relations to consciousness. The psychological phenomena that explain such modulations should not be identified with the causes of consciousness. Nor do they operate exclusively within the field of conscious awareness. If the explanation of those phenomena is to cast explanatory light on how and when consciousness occurs, it will need to do so in the context of some more complex explanatory theory.
Christopher Mole teaches in the Department of Philosophy at the University of British Columbia, where he is also the chair of the Programme in Cognitive Systems.
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