Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE ( © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 30 May 2020

Abstract and Keywords

The dominant paradigm on terrorism is what I call the Strategic Model of Terrorism. This model posits that perpetrators of terrorism attack civilians because of the unmatched effectiveness in pressuring government concessions. The strategic model is rooted in bargaining theory, which emphasizes how under anarchy escalating signals the will and ability to punish the target for non-compliance. Over the past decade, however, empirical research has found that neither escalating to terrorism nor with terrorism helps non-state actors to coerce government concessions. In fact, terrorism increases the odds that target countries will dig in their political heels and go on the offensive. These empirical findings raise important questions about why people use terrorism given the negative political return.

Keywords: strategic model of terrorism, terrorism effectiveness, bargaining theory, Schelling, outcome of terrorism, effects of terrorism

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.