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- Contributors
- Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates (Part 2)
- Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom
- Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will
- Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will
- The Causal Closure of Physics and Free Will
- The Consequence Argument Revisited
- A Compatibilist Reply to the Consequence Argument
- Compatibilism Without Frankfurt: Dispositional Analyses of free Will
- Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories
- Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility
- Who's Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
- Frankfurt-Type Examples and SemiCompatibilism: New Work
- Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism
- Obligation, Reason, and Frankfurt Examples
- Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom
- Alternatives for Libertarians
- Freedom and action without causation: Noncausal theories of freedom and purposive agency
- Free Will is not a Mystery
- Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem
- Free-Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life
- Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality Of Illusion
- Effects, Determinism, Neither Compatibilism Nor Incompatibilism, Consciousness
- Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges
- A Promising Argument
- Rollbacks, Endorsements, and Indeterminism
- Free Will and Science
- Contributions of Neuroscience to the Free Will Debate: From random movement to intelligible action
- Free Will and the Bounds of the Self
- Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing
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- Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article surveys the most recent versions of the Consequence Argument and objections to them. It considers objections made to some of the more well-known versions of the argument and recent attempts by defenders to answer these objections by offering reformulated versions of it. Many objections involve a principle van Inwagen called “Beta,” which is regarded by many as the most controversial assumption of the argument. Beta is a “transfer of powerlessness” principle, which states, roughly, that if you are powerless to change something “p” (e.g., the past or the laws of nature), then you are also powerless to change any of the logical consequences of “p.” The discussion considers various formulations of Beta as well as purported counterexamples to it and responses to these counterexamples by current defenders of the Consequence Argument.
Keywords: van Inwagen, Consequence Argument, powerlessness, Beta
Daniel Speak is associate professor of philosophy at Loyola Marymount University. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California, Riverside in 2002. His published work on free will and moral responsibility includes “Fanning the Flicker of Freedom” (American Philosophical Quarterly, 2001), “Toward an Axiological Defense of Libertarianism” (Philosophical Topics, 2004), and “The Impertinence of Frankfurt-Style Argument” (The Philosophical Quarterly, 2007). He is also interested in more general issues in metaphysics and the philosophy of religion.
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- [UNTITLED]
- [UNTITLED]
- Contributors
- Introduction: The Contours of Contemporary Free-Will Debates (Part 2)
- Divine Knowledge and Human Freedom
- Quantum Physics, Consciousness, and Free Will
- Chaos, Indeterminism, and Free Will
- The Causal Closure of Physics and Free Will
- The Consequence Argument Revisited
- A Compatibilist Reply to the Consequence Argument
- Compatibilism Without Frankfurt: Dispositional Analyses of free Will
- Contemporary Compatibilism: Mesh Theories and Reasons-Responsive Theories
- Moral Sense and the Foundations of Responsibility
- Who's Still Afraid of Determinism? Rethinking Causes and Possibilities
- Frankfurt-Type Examples and SemiCompatibilism: New Work
- Frankfurt-Friendly Libertarianism
- Obligation, Reason, and Frankfurt Examples
- Agent-Causal Theories of Freedom
- Alternatives for Libertarians
- Freedom and action without causation: Noncausal theories of freedom and purposive agency
- Free Will is not a Mystery
- Rethinking Free Will: New Perspectives on an Ancient Problem
- Free-Will Skepticism and Meaning in Life
- Free Will, Fundamental Dualism, and the Centrality Of Illusion
- Effects, Determinism, Neither Compatibilism Nor Incompatibilism, Consciousness
- Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges
- A Promising Argument
- Rollbacks, Endorsements, and Indeterminism
- Free Will and Science
- Contributions of Neuroscience to the Free Will Debate: From random movement to intelligible action
- Free Will and the Bounds of the Self
- Intuitions about Free Will, Determinism, and Bypassing
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- Index