- Consulting Editors
- Economic Perspectives on Peaceand Conflict
- Informational Aspects of Conflict
- Commitment Problems and Shifting Poweras a Cause of Conflict
- Bargaining and Conflict with Incomplete Information
- The Hobbesian Trap
- Religion, Conflict, and Cooperation
- Comparing Polarization Measures
- Inequality, Polarization, and Conflict
- On the Causes of Civil War
- Reflections on Africa’s Wars
- Methods For Measuring Aggregate Costs Of Conflict
- How Many Bucks in a Bang: On the Estimation of the Economic Costs of Conflict
- Estimating the Costs of War: Methodological Issues, with Applications to Iraq and Afghanistan
- Estimating the Human Costs of War: The Sample Survey Approach
- Mental Health In The Aftermath Of Conflict
- Measuring the Economic Costs of Terrorism
- Assessing the Effects of Military Expenditures on Growth
- The Economic Welfare Cost of Conflict: An Empirical Assessment
- Technologies of Conflict
- Endogenous Formation of Alliances in Conflicts
- Conflicts with Multiple Battlefields
- Laboratory Experiments on Conflict
- War, Trade, and Natural Resources: A Historical Perspective
- Trade in the Shadow of Power
- Conflict and Policy in General Equilibrium: Insights from a Standard Trade Model
- The Use of Coercion in Society: Insecure Property Rights, Conflict, and Economic Backwardness
- War and Poverty
- Aggressive Elites and Vulnerable Entrepreneurs: Trust and Cooperation in the Shadow of Conflict
- Globalization and International Conflict: Can Foreign Direct Investment Increase Cooperation Among Nations?
- National Borders, Conflict and Peace
- Political Institutions and War Initiation: The Democratic Peace Hypothesis Revisited
- Why Follow the Leader? Collective Action, Credible Commitment, and Conflict
- Conflict-Inhibiting Norms
Abstract and Keywords
This article explores settings in which international trade takes place in insecure environments or, alternatively, in the shadow of power. The first setting focuses on the case of two countries when trade between them is itself insecure. There, the country that produces the more highly valued good tends to have a comparative disadvantage in arming, less power, and thus lower income. In a setting in which there is an insecure input, countries might prefer autarky to free trade, and that comparative advantage can be distorted relative to what would prevail in the absence of insecurity.
Michelle R. Garfinkel is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Irvine. Her research focuses on conflict in numerous economic settings and has been published in such journals as the American Economic Review.
Stergios Skaperdas is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Irvine. His research has been published in a variety of journals, including the American Economic Review and the American Political Science Review.
Constantinos Syropoulos is Trustee Professor of International Economics in the LeBow College of Business at Drexel University.
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