- Series Information
- The Private Equity Contract
- Direct Investments in Private Firms by Institutional Investors: Issues And Evidence
- The Size and Internal Structure of Private Equity Firms
- Leveraged Buyouts and Public-to-Private Transactions
- Private Equity and Public Corporations
- Private Equity Governance and Financing Decisions
- Syndicate Partner Selection: who Syndicates with Whom?
- Industry Concentration, Syndication Networks, and Competition in the U.K. Private Equity Market for Management Buyouts
- A Competition Law Analysis of Private Equity “Club Deals”
- The Real Effects of Private Equity Buyouts
- Buyouts in Western European Countries: The Impact on Company Growth and Innovation
- The Limits of Private Equity: Evidence from Denmark
- Private Equity: Value Creation and Performance
- Do Private Equity Fund-of-Funds Managers Provide Value?
- Fund Size, Limited Attention, and Private Equity Valuation
- Private Equity Investors, Corporate Governance, and Performance of Ipo Firms
- The Role of Private Equity in Private Acquisitions
- Private Equity Activism and the Consequences for Targets and Rivals In Germany
- The Costs of Issuing Private Versus Public Equity for Entrepreneurial Ventures
- Risk and Return Characteristics of Listed Private Equity
- Listed Private Equity: A Genuine Alternative for an Alternative Asset Class
- Listed Private Equity and the Case of Exits
- Buyouts Around the World
- Leveraged Buyouts and Control-Oriented Investments in Asia
- Private Equity in China
Abstract and Keywords
This article analyzes leveraged buyouts and public-to-private (PTP) transactions. It studies the literature and data on announcement returns for public-to-private transactions and considers their motives. It lists the types of firms that go private, as well as the determinants of takeover premiums in leveraged buyout transactions. It also studies posttransaction value creation and the duration of private status, and views the shift to a private firm as a form of shock therapy that is used to restructure firms that create both strong short- and long-term returns. This article also addresses the questions of whether PTP transactions lead to superior organization forms compared to public firms or not.
Luc Renneboog is professor of corporate finance at Tilburg University. He graduated from the Catholic University of Leuven with degrees in management engineering and in philosophy, from the University of Chicago with an MBA, and from the London Business School with a PhD in finance. He has published in the Journal of Finance and the American Economic Review and is interested in mergers and acquisitions, insider trading, professional networks, and the economics of art.
Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.
If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.