- Introduction: Philosophy of Death
- When Do Things Die?
- Death and the Disintegration of Personality
- The Person and the Corpse
- Personal Identity and the Survival of Death
- The Evil of Death: What Can Metaphysics Contribute?
- Death and Eternal Recurrence
- Death in Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
- When Death Is There, We Are Not: Epicurus on Pleasure and Death
- The Badness of Death and the Goodness of Life
- The Symmetry Problem
- The Timing Problem
- Death, Value, and Desire
- Death and Rational Emotion
- Retroactive Harms and Wrongs
- The Makropulos Case RevisitedReflections on Immortality and Agency
- The Wrongness of Killing and the Badness of Death
- Abortion and Death
- The Morality of Killing in War: Some Traditional and Nontraditional Views
- The Significance of Death for Animals
- Capital Punishment
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter, which examines the relation between rational emotion and death, considers the question of whether one's own death can merit self-interested emotional distress and investigates whether it is rational to fear death. It also analyzes the relevance of Lucretius's symmetry argument and argues that the crucial notion of an emotion being merited by its object is both puzzling and problematic.
Kai Draper is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. He is author of “Rights and the Doctrine of Doing and Allowing” (Philosophy and Public Affairs 2004), “Disappointment, Sadness, and Death” (Philosophical Review 1999), and a variety of other articles in moral philosophy and epistemology.
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