- Animals in Classical and Late Antique Philosophy
- Animals and Ethics in the History of Modern Philosophy
- Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account
- Virtue Ethics and the Treatment of Animals
- A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals
- Utilitarianism and Animals
- Rights Theory and Animal Rights
- The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements
- The Idea of Moral Standing
- Animals, Fundamental Moral Standing, and Speciesism
- Human Animals and Nonhuman Persons
- Are Nonhuman Animals Persons?
- Animal Mentality: Its Character, Extent, and Moral Significance
- Mindreading and Moral Significance in Nonhuman Animals
- Minimal Minds
- Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals
- Animal Pain and Welfare: Can Pain Sometimes Be Worse for Them than for Us?
- Animals That Act for Moral Reasons
- The Moral Life of Animals
- On the Origin of Species Notions and Their Ethical Limitations
- On the Nature of Species and the Moral Significance of their Extinction
- Are All Species Equal?
- Genetically Modified Animals: Should There Be Limits to Engineering the Animal Kingdom?
- Human/Nonhuman Chimeras: Assessing the Issues
- The Moral Relevance of the Distinction Between Domesticated and Wild Animals
- The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death
- The Ethics of Confining Animals: From Farms to Zoos to Human Homes
- Keeping Pets
- Animal Experimentation in Biomedical Research
- Ethical Issues in the Application of Biotechnology to Animals in Agriculture
- Environmental Ethics, Hunting, and the Place of Animals
- The Use of Animals in Toxicological Research
- What's Ethics Got to Do with it?: The Roles of Government Regulation in Research-Animal Protection
- Literary Works and Animal Ethics
Abstract and Keywords
This article considers the defensibility of “species egalitarianism”—the position that all living things have equal moral standing and therefore all species command our respect. It challenges the view that there are good reasons to believe that all living things have moral standing in even a minimal sense. It explains why members of other species understandably and justifiably command our respect, but also why they cannot command equal respect. It also argues that there is reason to doubt that species egalitarianism is compatible with true respect for nature. The theory improperly suggests that the moral standing of dolphins is no higher than that of tuna, and that the standing of chimpanzees is no higher than that of mice. Such a view does not give dolphins and chimpanzees the respect they deserve.
David Schmidtz is Kendrick Professor at the University of Arizona. He teaches in Philosophy and in Economics, and holds a courtesy appointment at the McGuire Center for Entrepreneurship in the Eller College of Management. He is editor of Social Philosophy and Policy, and founding Director of the Arizona Center for Philosophy of Freedom. He serves on the board of BASIS High Schools and has taught first-year Property at Florida State College of Law. He is author of Rational Choice and Moral Agency (Princeton), Elements of Justice (Cambridge), Person, Polis, Planet (Oxford), and co-author of Social Welfare and Individual Responsibility (Cambridge, with Bob Goodin) plus Brief History of Liberty (Blackwell, with Jason Brennan). He currently is working on Markets in Education with Harry Brighouse for Oxford University Press. His articles have appeared in journals such as Political Theory, Journal of Philosophy, and Ethics (most recently on the topic of nonideal theory). His essays have been reprinted over 50 times (including Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Mandarin, simplified Chinese, German, Romanian, Slovak, Czech, and Turkish translations). His twelve former doctoral students all occupy faculty positions.
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