- Animals in Classical and Late Antique Philosophy
- Animals and Ethics in the History of Modern Philosophy
- Interacting with Animals: A Kantian Account
- Virtue Ethics and the Treatment of Animals
- A Humean Account of the Status and Character of Animals
- Utilitarianism and Animals
- Rights Theory and Animal Rights
- The Capabilities Approach and Animal Entitlements
- The Idea of Moral Standing
- Animals, Fundamental Moral Standing, and Speciesism
- Human Animals and Nonhuman Persons
- Are Nonhuman Animals Persons?
- Animal Mentality: Its Character, Extent, and Moral Significance
- Mindreading and Moral Significance in Nonhuman Animals
- Minimal Minds
- Beyond Anthropomorphism: Attributing Psychological Properties to Animals
- Animal Pain and Welfare: Can Pain Sometimes Be Worse for Them than for Us?
- Animals That Act for Moral Reasons
- The Moral Life of Animals
- On the Origin of Species Notions and Their Ethical Limitations
- On the Nature of Species and the Moral Significance of their Extinction
- Are All Species Equal?
- Genetically Modified Animals: Should There Be Limits to Engineering the Animal Kingdom?
- Human/Nonhuman Chimeras: Assessing the Issues
- The Moral Relevance of the Distinction Between Domesticated and Wild Animals
- The Moral Significance of Animal Pain and Animal Death
- The Ethics of Confining Animals: From Farms to Zoos to Human Homes
- Keeping Pets
- Animal Experimentation in Biomedical Research
- Ethical Issues in the Application of Biotechnology to Animals in Agriculture
- Environmental Ethics, Hunting, and the Place of Animals
- The Use of Animals in Toxicological Research
- What's Ethics Got to Do with it?: The Roles of Government Regulation in Research-Animal Protection
- Literary Works and Animal Ethics
Abstract and Keywords
This article argues that some animals are moral subjects in the sense that they can be, and sometimes are, motivated by moral considerations. It argues that there are no empirical or conceptual obstacles to regarding some animals as motivated by moral concerns. To suppose otherwise, the discussion notes, is to fall victim to certain views that invest quasi-magical properties in “meta-cognition”—properties that afford humans a status of a sort possessed by no other beings. It argues that the sentiments of animals can be genuinely moral ones and that there are no compelling reasons to suppose that these animals are not moral subjects that can be morally evaluated—even if they cannot be moral agents.
Mark Rowlands, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami-Coral Gables
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