- The Oxford Handbook of Spinoza
- Commonly Cited English Translations
- The Virtues of Geometry
- From Maimonides to Spinoza: Three Versions of an Intellectual Transition
- Spinoza and Descartes
- The Building Blocks of Spinoza’s Metaphysics: Substance, Attributes, and Modes
- But Why Was Spinoza a Necessitarian?
- The Principle of Sufficient Reason in Spinoza
- Spinoza and the Philosophy of Science: Mathematics, Motion, and Being
- Representation, Misrepresentation, and Error in Spinoza’s Philosophy of Mind
- Finite Subjects in the Ethics: Spinoza on Indexical Knowledge, the First Person, and the Individuality of Human Minds
- Spinoza on Skepticism
- The Highest Good and Perfection in Spinoza
- Spinoza on Mind
- The Intellectual Love of God
- The Metaphysics of Affects or the Unbearable Reality of Confusion
- Spinoza’s Unorthodox Metaphysics of the Will
- Spinoza’s Philosophy of Religion
- Spinoza’s Political Philosophy
- Leibniz’s Encounter with Spinoza’s Monism, October 1675 to February 1678
- Playing with Fire: Hume, Rationalism, and a Little Bit of Spinoza
- Kant and Spinoza Debating the Third Antinomy
- “Nothing Comes from Nothing”: Judaism, the Orient, and Kabbalah in Hegel’s Reception of Spinoza
- Nietzsche and Spinoza: Enemy-Brothers
- Spinoza’s Afterlife in Judaism and the Task of Modern Jewish Philosophy
- Spinoza’s Relevance to Contemporary Metaphysics
- Literary Spinoza
Abstract and Keywords
Hume is not a rationalist. This paper attempts to explain why by examining Hume’s argument in Treatise 1.3.3 from his separability principle to the denial of that hallmark of rationalism, the Principle of Sufficient Reason. The surprising source of Hume’s anti-rationalism reveals that his argument against rationalism is even stronger than has generally been appreciated and that only a rationalist such as Spinoza who embraces a strong form of monism is in a position to avoid the force of Hume’s argument. This special resiliency against Hume’s argument may help to explain some of Hume’s invective against Spinoza in Treatise 1.4.5.
Michael Della Rocca is Andrew Downey Orrick Professor of Philosophy at Yale University. He is the author of Representation and the Mind–Body Problem in Spinoza (1996), Spinoza (2008), and numerous articles in contemporary metaphysics and in early modern philosophy.
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