- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
- Preface
- Notes on the Contributors
- Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Logic: Introduction
- A Priority and Application: Philosophy of Mathematics in the Modern Period
- Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
- The Logicism of Frege, Dedekind, and Russell
- Logicism in the Twenty‐first Century
- Logicism Reconsidered
- Formalism
- Intuitionism and Philosophy
- Intuitionism in Mathematics
- Intuitionism Reconsidered
- Quine and the Web of Belief
- Three Forms of Naturalism
- Naturalism Reconsidered
- Nominalism
- Nominalism Reconsidered
- Structuralism
- Structuralism Reconsidered
- Predicativity
- Mathematics—Application and Applicability
- Logical Consequence, Proof Theory, and Model Theory
- Logical Consequence From a Constructivist View
- Relevance in Reasoning
- No Requirement of Relevance
- Higher‐order Logic
- Higher‐order Logic Reconsidered
- Index
Abstract and Keywords
This article focuses on Quine's positive views and their bearing on the philosophy of mathematics. It begins with his views concerning the relationship between scientific theories and experiential evidence (his holism), and relate these to his views on the evidence for the existence of objects (his criterion of ontological commitment, his naturalism, and his indispensability arguments). This sets the stage for discussing his theories concerning the genesis of our beliefs about objects (his postulationalism) and the nature of reference to objects (his ontological relativity). Quine's writings usually concerned theories and their objects generally, but they contain a powerful and systematic philosophy of mathematics, and the article aims to bring this into focus.
Keywords: philosophy of mathematics, Quine, scientific theories, experiential evidence, ontological commitment, postulationalism
Michael D. Resnik is University Distinguished Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is the author of Mathematics as a Science of Patterns (Oxford University Press, 1997) and Frege and the Philosophy of Mathematics (1980), as well as a number of articles in philosophy of mathematics and philosophy of logic.
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- Series Information
- The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mathematics and Logic
- Preface
- Notes on the Contributors
- Philosophy of Mathematics and Its Logic: Introduction
- A Priority and Application: Philosophy of Mathematics in the Modern Period
- Later Empiricism and Logical Positivism
- Wittgenstein on Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics
- The Logicism of Frege, Dedekind, and Russell
- Logicism in the Twenty‐first Century
- Logicism Reconsidered
- Formalism
- Intuitionism and Philosophy
- Intuitionism in Mathematics
- Intuitionism Reconsidered
- Quine and the Web of Belief
- Three Forms of Naturalism
- Naturalism Reconsidered
- Nominalism
- Nominalism Reconsidered
- Structuralism
- Structuralism Reconsidered
- Predicativity
- Mathematics—Application and Applicability
- Logical Consequence, Proof Theory, and Model Theory
- Logical Consequence From a Constructivist View
- Relevance in Reasoning
- No Requirement of Relevance
- Higher‐order Logic
- Higher‐order Logic Reconsidered
- Index
