- Introduction: Philosophy of Education and Philosophy
- The Epistemic Aims of Education
- Moral and Political Aims of Education
- Tagore, Dewey, and the Imminent Demise of Liberal Education
- Thinking, Reasoning, and Education
- Why Fallibility Has Not Mattered and How It Could
- Educating for Authenticity: The Paradox of Moral Education Revisited
- The Development of Rationality
- Philosophy and Developmental Psychology: Outgrowing the Deficit Conception of Childhood
- Socratic Teaching and Socratic Method
- Educating the Practical Imagination: A Prolegomena
- Caring, Empathy, and Moral Education
- Kantian Moral Maturity and the Cultivation of Character
- The Persistence of Moral Skepticism and the Limits of Moral Education
- Values Education
- Curriculum and the Value of Knowledge
- Education, Democracy, and Capitalism
- Art and Education
- Science Education, Religious Toleration, and Liberal Neutrality toward the Good
- Constructivisms, Scientific Methods, and Reflective Judgment in Science Education
- Empirical Educational Research: Charting Philosophical Disagreements in an Undisciplined Field
- Educating for Individual Freedom and Democratic Citizenship: In Unity and Diversity There Is Strength
- Mapping Multicultural Education
- Educational Authority and the Interests of Children
- Pragmatist Philosophy of Education
- Feminist Philosophy and Education
- Postmodernism and Education
Abstract and Keywords
This article offers an account of the nature of fallibility and its educational significance based on recent work in cognitive science and epistemology. It explains that fallibilism is the dominant epistemology in education and explains that the doctrine of fallibilism is an anti-dogmatic intellectual stance or attitude. It criticizes a type of fallibility that can only maintain its antiskepticism by introducing specialized usages for “certain” and “possibility”.
Jonathan E. Adler is Professor of Philosophy at Brooklyn College and the Graduate Center, CUNY. His main areas of research and publication are epistemology, philosophy of psychology and education, informal logic, and ethics. He is the author of Belief's Own Ethics (2002), co‐editor (with Catherine Z. Elgin) of Philosophical Inquiry: Classic and Contemporary Readings (2007), and co‐editor (with Lance Rips) of Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and Its Foundation (2008).
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