Show Summary Details

Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). © Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy and Legal Notice).

date: 12 November 2019

Abstract and Keywords

This article focuses on the relationship between reasons and rationality. It begins by explaining how Hume is led to his (grotesque) conclusion. The explanation lies in his view that the concepts of reason and rationality are best explained by reference to their relations in the theoretical domain, specifically in the domain of deductive reasoning. It then considers how Hume's conclusion might be avoided. The issue, to anticipate, is whether, once the understandings of the terms “reason” and “rationality” are liberalized in the way required to take a more sensible view about the nature of reason and rationality in the theoretical domain, there is a stable position left to take in the practical domain that retains anything of the spirit of Hume's remarks.

Keywords: reasons, rationality, Hume, theoretical domain, deductive reasoning

Access to the complete content on Oxford Handbooks Online requires a subscription or purchase. Public users are able to search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter without a subscription.

Please subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you have purchased a print title that contains an access token, please see the token for information about how to register your code.

For questions on access or troubleshooting, please check our FAQs, and if you can''t find the answer there, please contact us.