- Copyright Page
- Relativized Rankings
- Fault Lines in Ethical Theory
- Actualism, Possibilism, and the Nature of Consequentialism
- Consequentialism, Blame, and Moral Responsibility
- Consequentialism and Reasons for Action
- What Should a Consequentialist Promote?
- Understanding the Demandingness Objection
- Consequentialism and Partiality
- Must I Benefit Myself?
- Supererogation and Consequentialism
- Consequentialism and Promises
- Consequentialism, Ignorance, and Uncertainty
- Consequentialism and Action Guidingness
- Consequentialism and Indeterminacy
- Value Comparability
- Consequentialism, the Separateness of Persons, and Aggregation
- The Alienation Objection to Consequentialism
- Global Consequentialism
- The Role(s) of Rules in Consequentialist Ethics
- Consequentialism, Virtue, and Character
- Population Ethics, the Mere Addition Paradox, and the Structure of Consequentialism
- Deontic Pluralism and the Right Amount of Good
- Conflicts and Cooperation in Act Consequentialism
- The Science of Effective Altruism
- Effective Altruism: A Consequentialist Case Study
- Consequentialism and Nonhuman Animals
- Public Policy, Consequentialism, the Environment, and Nonhuman Animals
- The Love–Hate Relationship between Feminism and Consequentialism
- Act Consequentialism and the No-Difference Challenge
Abstract and Keywords
The consequences of our actions seem to matter. But what is the nature of the consequence relation that a particular act bears to, well, its consequences? This essay considers a number of traditional approaches to understanding the consequence relation. While many traditional approaches treat the consequence relation as built upon a causal relation, I hold that there are good reasons to doubt that the consequence relation should be understood in terms of causal relations, even if supplemented with the identity relation. Instead, I argue for a contrastive approach that, while not entirely free of problems, does a better job than standard accounts at capturing the relationship between an act and its consequences.
Dale Dorsey is Dean’s Professor and Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Kansas. He generally works in normative ethics, at the intersection of the personal good, morality, and practical rationality. He has also worked on metaethics and has written essays on the moral philosophy of David Hume, Francis Hutcheson, and John Stuart Mill.
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