- Stalnaker on the Essential Effect of Assertion
- Assertion and the Declarative Mood
- Assertion: The Constitutive Norms View
- Commitment Accounts of Assertion
- The Belief View of Assertion
- The Indicativity View
- Assertion: A Defective Theoretical Category
- Assertion among the Speech Acts
- Promising and Assertion
- Threats, Warnings, and Assertions
- Rhetorical Questions as Indirect Assertions
- Hedged Assertion
- Bullshit Assertion
- Slurs, Assertion, and Predication
- Proxy Assertion
- Can Groups Assert That P?
- Assertion and Convention
- Testing for Assertion
- Assertion and Mindreading
- Can Artificial Entities Assert?
- Assertion and Fiction
- <i>De Se</i> Assertion
- Assertion and the Future
- Assertion and Modality
- Assertibility and Paradox
- Assertion and Testimony
- Assertion of Knowledge
- Asserting Ignorance
- Assertoric Quality
- Austin on Asserting and Knowing
- Formal Models of Assertion
- Epistemic Norms of Assertion and Action
- Moore’s Paradox and Assertion
- The Function of Assertion and Social Norms
- Silencing and Assertion
- Social Identity and Assertion
- Ethical Dimensions of Assertion
- The Norm of Assertion and Blame
- Assertion, Lying, and Untruthfully Implicating
Abstract and Keywords
If I were to say, “Agnes does not know that it is raining, but it is,” this seems like a perfectly coherent way of describing Agnes’s epistemic position. If I were to add, “And I don’t know if it is, either,” this seems quite strange. In this chapter, we shall look at some statements that seem, in some sense, contradictory, even though it seems that these statements can express propositions that are contingently true or false. Moore thought it was paradoxical that statements that can express true propositions or contingently false propositions should nevertheless seem absurd like this. If we can account for the absurdity, we shall solve Moore’s Paradox. In this chapter, we shall look at Moore’s proposals and more recent discussions of Moorean absurd thought and speech.
Clayton Littlejohn is Reader in Philosophy at King's College London.
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