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date: 26 February 2021

Abstract and Keywords

The traditional central bank consensus is designed around two mandates: monetary and financial stability. Following the Great Stagflation of the 1970s, central banks’ policy objective became biased toward maintaining a low and stable rate of inflation or monetary stability. This was based on the presumption that a stable price level would achieve both monetary and financial system stability. The deemphasis on financial stability remained until the global financial crisis, when the prevailing consensus was exposed for being thoroughly inadequate. A new consensus has emerged that broadens central banks’ financial stability mandate to include macroprudential supervision. This chapter analyzes the new central bank consensus, how this has resulted in institutional redesign, and the effectiveness of discharging postcrisis financial and monetary stability mandates.

Keywords: prudential regulation, monetary stability, financial stability, macroprudential policy, financial regulatory structure

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