- Theoretical Strategies to Define Disability
- Disability, Health, and Difference
- Philosophy and the Apparatus of Disability
- What’s Wrong with “You Say You’re Happy, but … ” Reasoning?
- Epistemic Exclusion, Injustice, and Disability
- Interactions with Delusional Others: Reflections on Epistemic Failures and Virtues
- Cognitive Disability and Embodied, Extended Minds
- Disabilities and Well-Being: The Bad and the Neutral
- Habilitative Health and Disability
- The Visible and the Invisible: Disability, Assistive Technology, and Stigma
- Contractualism, Disability, and Inclusion
- Civic Republican Disability Justice
- Reproductive Choice in Context: Avoiding Excess and Deficiency?
- The Limiting Role of Respect
- Respect, Identification, and Profound Cognitive Impairment
- A Dignitarian Approach to Disability: From Moral Status to Social Status
- Dignity, Respect, and Cognitive Disability
- Disability, Rationality, and Justice: Disambiguating Adaptive Preferences
- Educational Justice for Students with Intellectual Disabilities
- Neurotechnologies and Justice by, with, and for Disabled People
- Second Thoughts on Enhancement and Disability
- Cost-Effectiveness Analysis and Disability Discrimination
- The Disability Case Against Assisted Dying
- Prioritization and Parity: Which Disabled Newborn Infants Should Be Candidates for Scarce Life-Saving Treatment?
- On Moral Status and Intellectual Disability: Challenging and Expanding the Debates
- Cognitive Disability and Moral Status
- Bioethics, Disability, and Selective Reproductive Technology: Taking Intersectionality Seriously
- Procreation and Intellectual Disability: A Kantian Approach
- Parental Autonomy, Children with Disabilities, and Horizontal Identities
- Why People with Cognitive Disabilities Are Justified in Feeling Disquieted by Prenatal Testing and Selective Termination
- Ideals of Appreciation and Expressions of Respect
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter examines the ways in which disabled people are subject to epistemic injustice. It starts by introducing how social epistemology models the creation of shared knowledge and then uses feminist epistemology to highlight the role of social and political power in producing epistemic privilege, exclusion, and oppression. The well-known concepts of testimonial and hermeneutic epistemic injustice are discussed in relation to disability, showing how these forms of injustice are frequently experienced within the lives of disabled people. In particular, disabled experience has features that distinguish it from the experiences of sexism and racism most commonly used as illustrations of epistemic injustice. The chapter ends by arguing that the potential for epistemic injustice poses unprecedented risks for disabled people in the current context, which could be minimized by recognizing that ignorance about disabled lives is not inevitable, but something that can and should be challenged.
Jackie Leach Scully is Professor of Social Ethics and Bioethics, and Co-Director at the Policy, Ethics and Life Sciences Research Centre, Newcastle University, UK. Her research interests include the formation of moral understandings by religious and non-religious groups, especially around new technologies; feminist bioethics; and disability. Her publications include Quaker Approaches to Moral Issues in Genetics (Edwin Mellen, 2002), Good and Evil: Quaker Perspective, co-edited with Pink Dandelion (Ashgate, 2007), and Disability Bioethics: Moral Bodies, Moral Difference (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), as well as numerous articles on bioethical issues.
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