- The Oxford Handbook of Social and Political Trust
- About the Editor
- The Study of Trust
- Measuring Trust
- Social and Political Trust
- Trust and National Identity
- Trust and Democracy
- Ingroup-Outgroup Trust: Barriers, Benefits, and Bridges
- Biological and Psychological Influences on Interpersonal and Political Trust
- Trust and Participation in Associations
- Ethnic Diversity and Social Trust: A Critical Review of the Literature and Suggestions for a Research Agenda
- Cultural Persistence or Experiential Adaptation?: A Review of Studies Using Immigrants to Examine the Roots of Trust
- Trust and Minority Groups
- Trust and Rational Choice
- Trust Experiments, Trust Games, and Surveys
- Trust Games: Game-Theoretic Approaches to Embedded Trust
- Trust in Newly Democratic Regimes
- Social and Political Trust in Developing Countries: Sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America
- Trust and the Welfare State
- New Evidence on Trust and Well-Being
- Trust and Population Health
- Trust and Corruption
- Trust and Tax Morale
- Social Trust and Economic Growth
- Foundations of Political Trust
- Political Trust and Polarization
- Economic Performance and Political Trust
- Trust and Elections
- Trust in Justice
- Trust in International Actors
- Trust in International Relations
Abstract and Keywords
This article offers an overview of different variants of trust games and shows how game-theoretic modeling can contribute to an analysis of conditions for placing and honoring trust in such games. The focus is on explaining trust rather than on explaining consequences of trust for individual behavior or for outcomes such as societal cohesion or economic prosperity. Specifically, game-theoretic modeling allows for analyzing how the “embeddedness” of trust games in long-term relations between actors and in networks of relations can be a basis for informal norms and institutions of trust. Game-theoretic modeling also allows for analyzing actors’ incentives to modify embeddedness characteristics so that informal norms and institutions of trust become feasible. We discuss how game-theoretic models can be used to derive testable predictions for experiments with trust games and sketch empirical evidence from such experiments.
Vincent Buskens is Professor of Theoretical Sociology in the Department of Sociology at Utrecht University and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS).
Vincenz Frey is a postdoctoral researcher in the Department of Sociology at Utrecht University and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS).
Werner Raub is Professor of Sociology at Utrecht University and the Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (ICS).
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