- The Oxford Handbook of Freedom
- Self-Ownership as a Form of Ownership
- Positive Freedom and the General Will
- Moralized Conceptions of Liberty
- On the Conflict Between Liberty and Equality
- Freedom and Equality
- The Point of Self-Ownership
- Platonic Freedom
- Aristotelian Freedom
- Freedom in the Scholastic Tradition
- Freedom, Slavery, and Identity in Renaissance Florence: The Faces of Leon Battista Alberti
- Freedom and Enlightenment
- Adam Smith’s Libertarian Paternalism
- Market Failure, the Tragedy of the Commons, and Default Libertarianism in Contemporary Economics and Policy
- Planning, Freedom, and the Rule of Law
- Freedom, Regulation, and Public Policy
- Boundaries, Subjection to Laws, and Affected Interests
- Democracy and Freedom
- Can Constitutions Limit Government?
- Freedom and Religion
- Freedom and Influence in Formative Education
- Freedom and the (Posthumous) Harm Principle
- Exploitation and Freedom
- Voluntariness, Coercion, Self-ownership
- The Impartial Spectator and the Moral Teachings of Markets
- Disciplinary Specialization and Thinking for Yourself
- Free Will as a Psychological Accomplishment
- Prisoners of Misbelief: The Epistemic Conditions of Freedom
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter explores the epistemic conditions of freedom, arguing that even on a relatively thin conception of freedom, misbelief can make us seriously unfree in several ways. Freedom-undermining false beliefs include (1) beliefs about what one is doing, (2) false beliefs about the circumstances in which one is acting, (3) beliefs about the effective means for achieving one’s ends, (4) beliefs about the range of options open to one, and (5) shared beliefs that impair collective freedom. It follows that anyone who is committed to leading a life of integrity, self-direction, and self-knowledge ought to be much more concerned about the problem of misbelief than people generally and moral theorists typically are. For cognitively flawed but belief-driven creatures like us, who get most of our beliefs second-hand through the "testimony" of others, such concern is mandatory, both morally and prudentially.
Allen Buchanan is James B. Duke Professor of Philosophy and Professor of Law at Duke University, where he is also an Investigator at the Institute of Genome Sciences and Policy. Buchanan's work is mainly in Bioethics and in Political Philosophy. His most
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