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date: 11 December 2018

Abstract and Keywords

In this chapter I analyze how transparency can deter corruption. I first review the concept of corruption, its types, and the reasons why it exists. I then consider corrupt relationships as multiagency relationships before explaining how transparency can help tackle corruption by solving the information asymmetries in the agency relationships. I argue that increasing transparency, although necessary, is not sufficient to reduce corruption, and I suggest that transparency must be complemented by monitoring and punishment to be effective at reducing corruption.

Keywords: corruption, information asymmetries, monitoring, multiagency relationships, punishment, transparency

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