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date: 21 November 2018

(p. 523) Subject Index

(p. 523) Subject Index

accident avoidance 13–14
accident model 24
act utilitarianism 291
ad coelum rule 278
affective forecasting errors 386
agencies, delegation to 194
agency behaviour 194–5
allocative efficiency 300
almost expert rule 496
almost majority rule 496
American Pragmatism 305
anchoring effects, in adjudication 87–8
apologies, and culpability 108–10
arbitrary/capricious decision-making challenges 226
Army Corps of Engineers 363
Arrow’s Theorem 183–4, 186, 500
artificial commodity 78
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 53–5
asymmetric information hypothesis 86–7
Austrian law 268–85
analysis method 269
coherence in law 280–2
common law incentives 281
coordination in society 276–9
decentralized knowledge 272–6
dispersed knowledge 273
distinctiveness of 284
emergence of legal rules 269
emergence of money 269
endogenous legal rules 280
entrepreneurship 282–5
knowledge problems 273, 279
legal institutions 269–72, 275
and legal order 279–82, 285
processes 269
rules 273–6
spontaneous processes 271–2
time and ignorance, economics of 272–6
and trade development 270–1
automobile safety/fatalities 71–4
availability heuristic
debiasing 68
in risk estimation 66–8
avoidable consequences doctrine 428
bargaining experiments 83
Batson v. Kentucky 131
Bayes’ Rule 96–7
BCA (benefit-cost analysis) see CBA (cost-benefit analysis)
behavioural economics 11
and law 60–74
and nonomniscience 61–74
belief elicitation 89
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly 53–5
benefit versus expected loss liability 93
bicameral legislature 229
bicameralism 223
bilateral care model 14, 15, 16
bounded rationality
and law 60–74
and moral philosophy 295
and nonomniscience see nonomniscience
Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke Corporation 422, 425–6, 432
BPS (Becker-Polinsky-Shavell) enforcement model 17–18
breach of contract 112–14
Bush, President George W. 376, 377
calculus of choice 311–12
Calculus of Consent 204, 248, 254, 258, 264
carrots and sticks 437–63
activity-level effects 437, 453–4
agents’ compliance/violation 458
(p. 524) agents’ self-reporting 437, 454–5
annullable 455–8
behavior reinforcement 460
behavioral biases 438
behavioural economics 460–1
certain monitoring with no errors 439
combined 458
compliance and carrots 441–5
coordinated monitoring 447–8
and corruption 458
distributional effects 437, 451–5
enforcement errors 440
enforcement with information problems 443–4
enforcement level 438
equilibrium compliance 443
incentive equivalence result 437, 438–40
information effects 443–5
intra-group financed carrots 458–9
intra-group redistributed sticks 458–9
liability 438
majoritarian criterion 443
multiplication effect of sticks 449–51
optimal choice between 438, 461–2
overcompensating carrots 451–2
political risks 438, 460
population effect 448–9
pre-compensated 455
as prima facie equivalent 437
principals’ opportunistic behaviour 437, 454
probabilistic monitoring 439–40
reversible rewards 459
risk allocation/aversion 437, 444–5
saturation effect 438
strict liability 459–60
transactions costs 437, 441–4
undercompensating sticks 451–2
violation and sticks 441–5
wealth of agent, and stick 446–7
wealth of principal, and carrot 446–7
wealth/budget constraints (agents and principals) 437, 445–51
causal inference, in experimental economics 84
causality, of self-serving bias 86
causation 19
CBA (cost-benefit analysis)
Baker’s critique 370
comparable units 360
constant rates 371–3
consumer and producer surpluses 358
critiques of law and economics 304
CV (compensating variation) 358
definition 357–60
discount factor 373–4
discount rate 370–5
distributionally weighted 390–3
early use of 355–7
economic origins of 360–2
EKH (Expanded Kaldor-Hicks) 364–5, 366–7, 373
general equilibrium analysis 357–8
history of use 363–4
issues with 366–75
KH (Kaldor-Hicks) 358–9, 360–2, 364–5, 368, 373
in legal decision-making 355–77
legal landscape 355–7
limitations of 304–5
measurement in gains and losses 359
mentions in legal cases 356
and moral sentiments 366–8
Nash equilibrium behavior 503
partial equilibrium analysis 357–8
PCT (potential compensation test) 358, 362, 365, 368, 370
policing 50
PPF (project production possibility frontier) 368
present values 360
principles and standards 375–7
project rule 365
RIA (Regulatory Impact Analyses) 363
Scitovsky reversals 365, 368–70
SOC (Social Opportunity Cost of Capital) 371–3
SPC (Shadow Price of Capital) 371
STP (Social rate of Time Preference) 371–2
and SWB 381–2, 384
time declining rates 373–5
(p. 525) TP (time preference) 371
WTA (willingness to accept) 358–9, 365, 367
WTP (willingness to pay) 358–9, 362, 365
centralization, in federal states 213
certainty of the law 275
Chevron doctrine 224, 226, 236
Chicago school 12, 305
civil procedure, empirical law 53–5
Clinton, President Bill 363–4, 385
clubs theory 172
Coase Theorem 19–20, 90–2, 173
Coleman’s preference reversal example 369–70
collective decision-making
almost expert rule 496
almost majority rule 496
applications 507–8
asymmetric alternatives 500–1
diverse preferences 499–500
doctrinal paradox example 506–7
endogenous competencies 497–9
ER (expert rule) 496, 497
heterogenous competencies 494–5
hung-jury problem 505–6
information cascades 505
and jury theorems 492–508
latent competencies 504–5
multi-criteria decisions 506–7
optimal decision rules 495–6
optimal human capital investment 498
optimal restricted majority rules 496
order of decision rules 497
QMR (qualified majority rule) 500–1
SMR (simple majority rule) 496, 497, 499, 502, 504, 505
strategic behavior 502–4
strategic voting 503–4
tie-breaking chairman rule 496
violation of independence 501–2
WMR (weighted majority rule) 496, 499, 501–2, 503
WQMR (weighted qualified majority rule) 501
see also juries
common law development 283
common law incentives 281
Community Oriented Policing Services program 49
compensation 15, 23
concrete information 68
Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) 492–4, 495, 499–500, 502, 503, 505
Condorcet’s paradox 185
Conley v.Gibson 53
consequentialism 290–1
consideration instrument 226
Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. The City of Los Angeles 423
constitutional economics
amendment culture 217
constitutional assemblies 216
constitutional interpretation by courts 218
corruption 211–12, 214
datasets/indicators 217
decision-making costs 204
democracy and productivity 215
efficiency 205
electoral rules 206–8
electoral systems 206–8
endogenizing constitutional rules 215–17
external costs 204
federalism 211–13
fiscal policy 214
forms of government 208–10
future development 217–18
governance quality 214–15
horizontal separation of powers 208–10
interdepence costs 204
and judiciary 210
and law 202–18
methodological foundations 203–5
MR (majority rule) systems 206–8, 217
normative constitutional economics 203–6
omitted variables bias 218
PCE (positive constitutional economics) 206–17
PR (proportional representation) systems 206–8, 217
presidential vs. parliamentary systems 208–10
and principal-agent framework 214
representative vs. direct democracy 213–15
vertical separation of powers 211–13
(p. 526) constitutional rules 202–18
consumer nonomniscience 67
contract law 16
and social psychology 147–8
contract performance/breach instrument 226
contract transaction costs 428–9
contractarian perspectives
choice individualism 256, 261
choice of rules 251
consent vs. legitimization by consent 262–4
and constitutional economics 265
constitutional political economy 250–2
constitutional vs. welfare economics 254–6
constraints choice 251
contractarian conjectural history 248
contractarian theory 247
contractarianism issues 247–50
contractual relations and market rules 251
CPE (constitutional political economy) research 246, 248, 250–60, 262, 264
economics of rules 250
efficiency 256
exogenous standards 252
idealized consent 264
in law and economics 246–65
level of actions 250
methodological individualism 247
new institutional economics 250
normative individualism 247
normative standards 252
order of actions 250
order of rules 250
original/ongoing agreement distinction 249–50
outcome evaluation vs. constitutional reform 257–9
politics as exchange 252–4
preference aggregation 257
public/self interest 258
reconciliation 262–4
social welfare function 255, 256
sub-constitutional/constitutional level distinction 251
unanimity principle 252–4
utility individualism 255, 256, 260, 261
wealth maximization and consent 259–62
contracts
breach of 112–14
exculpatory clauses 111–12
moral psychology of 111–15
and promissory obligation 111–15
and rational wealth maximization 147
willingness to breach 112
contractual promise 16
contractual uncertainty 114
convergence to equilibrium 93
convergent evolution 17
coordination, in society 276–9
corporate law and economics 50–3
cost-benefit analysis see CBA
courts
and asymmetric information 435
constitutional interpretation 218
in democracies 195
CPE (constitutional political economy) see contractarian perspectives
credibility revolution 30, 47–50
critiques of law and economics 300–13
calculus of choice 311–12
CBA (cost-benefit analysis) 304
efficiency in economic analysis 303
fact-value distinction 312
interpretative critique of economic analysis of law 305–12
invariance principle 310–11
methodological critiques 303–5
methodological individualism 310
normative critiques 300–3
normative value of wealth maximization 300–2, 312
point of viewlessness 309–10
systems boundaries in economic analysis 304
utility and income distribution 304
wealth/welfare maximization and efficiency 302–3
culpability 142
cultural cognition 117–19
curse of knowledge 93
CV (compensating variation) 358
Daley v. Irwin 427–8
damages assesment 111
(p. 527) damages instrument 226
damages liability 16, 109–11
data restriction 44
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. 95
Davies v. Mann 429
debiasing
and availability heuristic 68
educational loans 68–9
through experiments 96–7
through law 61, 69–72
decentralized knowledge 272–6
decision utility 382
decomposability of rules system 274
deontology 290–1
deregulation 305
deterrence, and compensation 15
DHS (Department of Homeland Security) 49
dice lottery 89
difficulty-of-ratification index 216
discrepancy-reducing sentencing guidelines 64
dispersed knowledge 273
dispute resolution, experimental psychology 115–16
doctrinal paradox 506–7
driver’s licenses 71–4
DRM (day reconstruction method) 383, 397
due care standard 14
early remorse 110
Economic Analysis of Law 281
economic models of law 9–25
assumptions 10
behavioural economics 11
Coase Theorem 19–20
criminal law 17–18, 22–3
economic analysis of law 12, 13–18
economics of crime 17–18, 47–50
and empiricism 11
general transaction structure 21–2
goals/objectives of law 12
and incentives 9, 24
law and economics 18–23
law and markets 12, 13–18
methodology 9
model building 23–5
model of precaution 16–17
nature of models 10–11
property rules vs. liability rules 20–1
shared characteristics 11
social welfare 12
tests of 10–11
tort law 13–15
economic terms, in law 308
economics of rules 250
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Company 131
efficiency, in economic analysis 303, 308
EKH (Expanded Kaldor-Hicks) test 364–5, 366–7, 373
ELE (evolutionary law and economics)
Coase Theorem 173, 174
common law 165–6
competing jurisdictions 172–5
continuity hypothesis 162
definition of evolution 161–2
discrimination 168, 170
dynamic competition 174
and economics 161–75
and efficiency 165–7
interdependent jurisdictions 171, 172–5
judge-made law 165–6
legal evolution in stable environment 164–7
microeconomic models of legal evolution 164–71
neo-institutional approaches 162–4, 175
normative perspective 168
property rights 162–4
social norms and law 167–70
technology and law 170–1
third-degree path dependance 167
transplanted law 168
Universal Darwinism 161–2
empirical law
challenges and credibility 33–47
civil procedure 53–5
comparison groups 41
control function 39–42
control variables 30–1
corporate law and economics 50–3
credibility revolution 30, 47–50
difference estimators 41
and economics 29–56
external validity 32
(p. 528) function approach 39
history of 30–3
instrumental variable estimation 32, 42–4, 48
internal validity 32
linear-in-controls assumption 39
omitted variables bias 30–1, 34, 39, 48
policy changes 31
random assignment 37–8
real/natural experiments 41
reduced form modeling 33–7
regression discontinuity approaches 44–7
scaling up approach 45
structural modeling 33
employment discrimination 133
endowment effect 92
in intellectual property 116–17
entrepreneurship 282–4
ER (expert rule) 496, 497
ESM (experience sampling method) 382–3, 397
event lottery 89
evolutionary law and economics see ELE
ex ante probability 94, 110
ex ante vs. ex post 420–35
allocating and rights/obligations 420
asymmetric information and courts 435
auctions and rights 420
avoidable consequences doctrine 428
bankruptcy 434–5
contract transaction costs 428–9
damage mitigation 427–8
damage prevention costs 430–1
first party rights 433–5
hunting 435
land use 421–6
last clear chance doctrine 429, 432
marginal cost civil liability 431–2
marginal cost liability 427, 428, 430
mitigation of damages 427
negligence and liability rules 426–7
optimal sequence determination 421–6
real estate sales 435
rescue law 432–3
secured/unsecured debt 434–5
suboptimal behavior 426–33
exculpatory clauses, contracts 111–12
excuse of performance for mistake instrument 226
Executive Order (EO) 12291 375, 376
Executive Order (EO) 12498 376
Executive Order (EO) 12866 363–4, 376
Executive Order (EO) 13258 376
Executive Order (EO) 13497 376
Executive Order (EO) 13514 376
experimental economics
anchoring effects in adjudication 87–8
applications 95
assumption-based 80
at trial 94–7
bargaining experiments 83
causal inference 84
Coase Theorem 90–2
controlled experimental design 79–81
as evidence 94–6
and evidence admissability 95–6
experiment sessions 84
in-court institutions 87–90
induced-value theory 81–2
judges and juries 87–90
and law 78–98
and legal institutions 85–90
in legal practice 94–7
in litigation strategy 96–7
methodology of 79–84
negligence/tort liability 92–4
neuroeconomic experiments 83
out-of-court institutions 85–7
repetition and replication 84
scaled observation 82–3
settlement bargaining 85–7
settlement failure model 85
statistical inference on data 84
understanding legal doctrine 90–4
experimental psychology
apologies 108–9
bankruptcy filers 120–1
cognitive styles 117
contracts and promissory obligation 111–15
cultural cognition 117–19
deception 105–6
as descriptive enterprise 105
dispute resolution 115–16
incentive compatibility 106
individual differences 117–19
intellectual property 116–17
and law 104–21
main effects 117
methodological considerations 105–7
moral psychology in contracts 111–15
numeracy and decision-making 119
race differences 119–20
settlement biases 108–11
statistical significance testing 107
subjects 106–7
tort law biases 108–11
fact-based legal instrument 235
fact-value distinction 312
fair process effect 115–16
false convictions 88
false positive 97
federalism 211–13
FJC (Federal Judicial Center) 53
FOCJ (functional overlapping competing jurisdictions) 172
Frye v. United States 95
game theory, and negligence law 15
GDP (Gross Domestic Product), happiness-based alternatives to 394–7
general equilibrium effects 38
GTS (General Transaction Structure) 21–3
Hadley vs. Baxendale 16
HDI (Human Development Index) 381–2, 394
hedonic psychology 382
hindsight bias 93, 94, 110, 124
HLE (Happy Life Expectancy) 394, 397
human happiness 302–3, 386
hypothetical consent 292
IAH (Inequality-Adjusted Happiness) 396, 397
IAT (Implict Association Test) 130
idealized consent 264
imperative theory of law 466
imperfect compliance 45
inalienability rules 23
incentives see carrots and sticks
induced-value theory 81–2
institutional design see mechanism design
institutional self-dealing 216
intellectual property 116–17
interest group theory 184–5
interpretation theory 311
interpreting texts 306–7
interpretive critique 305–12
interpretive turn 307
interrogation see social psychology
invariance principle 310–11
Iqbal (Ashcroft v. Iqbal) 53–5
judge-made law, and efficiency 165
judicial decision-making 87–90, 210, 222–42
background 224–8
balancing test 227
basic elements 224
challenges to regulation 226
and constitutional economics 210
decision costs 227–8
decision instruments 225–6
doctrinal form 226–7
doctrine choice 232–5
and efficiency 227
horizontal competition 225, 228–31, 242
instruments 226, 232, 235–7
internal theater of competition 237–41
law as strategy 228–41
legal doctrine/precedent 225–6
legal rules 230
panel effects 225, 238–41
rules vs. standards 226–7
theaters of competition 225, 228–37
vertical competition 225, 232–7, 242
judiciary
independence 195–6, 210
motivation of 196–7
political ideologies 196–7
and precedent 197, 238
juries 87–90
and apologies/remorse 138–9
and confessions 136–7
decision-making models 127–8
doctrinal paradox example 506–7
hung juries 505–6
(p. 530) intentional harms 145
motivated reasoning 144–5
multi-criteria decisions 506–7
pre-deliberation preference 127
race issues 132
juror decision-making 126
jury awards, and time 110
jury size, and damage awards 128
jury theorems, and collective decision-making see collective decision-making
Kelo v. City of New London 146
knowledge problems 273
labor earnings tax system/taxation 323
last clear chance doctrine 429, 432
LATE (Local Average Treatment Effect) parameter 44
law
certainty of 275
coherence in 280–2
common law incentives 281
economic models of see economic models of law
economic terms in 308
and future of economics 1–5
and PPT (positive political theory) 181, 222–42
and precedents 282
and social norms 167–70
as strategy 223–4
and technology 170–1
Law as a System of Signs 306
law-based legal instrument 235
legal craft 233
legal doctrine 225–6
legal efficiency criterion 307
legal entrepreneurship 282–4
legal institutions, and public choice theory see public choice theory
legal intervention, Coase Theorem 19–20
legal order, and economic activity 279–82
legal rules 346
lex mercatoria rules 167–8
liability rule 20–3, 90
life satisfaction survey 383
litigation choice, and efficiency 166
litigation strategy, experiments in 96–7
logical coherence of law 281
logical-possibility test 53
loss aversion 62–4
Lotka-Volterra model 170
LSAT scores 44–7
lump sum tax types 326
Mahlstadt v. City of Indianola 422, 426, 432, 434
mandatory disclosure 52
marginal cost civil liability 431
marginal cost liability 427, 428, 430
market-for-corporate-control hypothesis 51, 52
market/legal exchange, and property rules 20
Mechanical Turk 107
mechanism design
auction theory 488
Dominance Solvability 481, 485, 489
incentive compatibility 483, 484, 485
and the law 481–90
legal evolution 483
legal mechanism examples 481–5
literature on 488–9
procurement auctions 488
Revelation Principle 481, 485–9
ring formation 483
Welfare Optimization 486
welfaristic 485–8
mens rea 142
methodological individualism 310
mitigation of damages 427
model building 23–5
model of precaution 16–17
moral character, and punishment 139–41
moral philosophy
consequentialism 290–1
and criticism of law and economics 293–7
and defense of law and economics 291–3
deontology 290–1
and economic analysis 288–9
efficiency and justice 293–4
(p. 531) efficiency of law and economics 288–90
efficiency and morality 288–91
human behaviour modeling 294–5
hypothetical consent 292
in law and economics 288–97
and non-commercial behaviour 296
and public choice theory 296–7
secular 290
and tort law 294–5
types of 290–1
understanding/misunderstanding law 295–6
virtue ethics 290–1
and wealth maximization 290, 291–2, 293
welfare economics 293–4
moral psychology, in contracts 111–15
motivated reasoning 144–5
Mountain State College v. Holsinger 68–9
MPC (Model Penal Code) 142–3
mutual assent instrument 226
Nash equilibrium 15
negligence law 13–15, 92–4, 124, 260
negotiation 128–30
neuroeconomic experiments 83
new institutional economics 250
no liability rule 15
non-commercial behaviour, and moral philosophy 296
non-experimental randomization 38
non-infringement defense instrument 226
nonconforming land use 424
nonomniscience
automobile fatalities 71–4
and availability heuristic 66–8
in behavioural law and economics 61–6
and criminal justice system 62–4
and debiasing through law 66–74
driver’s licenses 71–4
mandated disclosure in educational loans 66–71
and obesity 65–6
optimism-based 63
organ donation 71–4
and self-regulation 64–6
nonoptimization
and criminal justice system 62–4
and obesity 61, 65–6
and self-regulation 64–5
norm entrepreneurs 468–9
Obama, President Barack 376, 385
OIRA (Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs) 375–7
OLS (ordinary least squares) estimator 35–7, 44, 51
OMB (Office of Management and Budget) 372, 375–7
omitted variables bias 30–1, 34, 39, 48, 218
opinion formation model 169
optimal criminal punishment 18
optimal human capital investment 498
optimal labor earnings taxation 338
optimal redistributional instruments
arbitrage approach 341–4
arbitrage-like conditions for eclecticism 343–4
artificially separated legal system 346
behaviourally responsive attributes 345
distributing through labor earnings tax 348–9
distributional policy 349–50
distributionally motivated adjustments 341
in law and economics 321–50
literature on 322, 350
optimal taxation 322, 341–6
policy certainty in conventional framework 347
policy eclecticism 322, 333, 341–6, 347
policy uncertainty 322, 346–50
tax substitution argument see tax substitution argument
taxing immutable tags 344–5
optimal restricted majority rules 496
optimal tax and policy framework 322, 347
optimism bias 62–4, 67, 70–2
organ donation 71–4
ou-of-court settlements 129
panel effects 225, 238–41
paradox of compensation 15
Pareto analysis 289–90
Parkersburg Rig and Reel Co. v. Freed Oil and Gas Co. 428
(p. 532) patent invalidity defense instrument 226
The Path of the Law 10
PCE (positive constitutional economics) 206–17
PCT (potential compensation test) 358, 362, 365
Pierson v. Post 435
Pigovian taxation 13, 327, 329
pirates, and governance 271
plausibility standard 53
plea bargaining 63–4
point of viewlessness 309–10
police interrogation see social psychology
policing, and crime 48–50, 55
political entrepreneurship 284
Popitz’s law 213
PPF (project production possibility frontier) 368
PPT (positive political theory) 181, 222–42
prediction theory 10
preference aggregation 257
preference induction 82
principal-agent theory of panel effects 238–41
The Problem of Social Cost 295
procedural justice 129
products liability 12
promissory obligation, and contracts 111–15
property law, and social psychology 145–7
property rights, evolutionary law 162–4
property rule 20–1, 90
public choice theory
adminstrative agencies 194–5
agency behavior 194–5
constitutional design 188–9
constitutional structure 188–90, 189–90
courts 195–7
creation/implementation of legislation 191–8
decentralization 189–90
delegation to agencies 194
federalism 189–90
institutional structures 181–8
interbranch interactions 197–8
interest groups 184–5, 198
judicial independence 195–6
judicial motivation 196–7
and legal institutions 181–99
legislative structure/process 192–4
legislator motivation 191–2
legislatures 191–4
and moral philosophy 296–7
option symmetry 186–7
overview of 182–8
and political structures/processes 199
procedural rules 193
public choice and public law 198–9
re-election theory 191–2
statutory interpretation 198
voting and agendas 185–8
public policy, and well-being see well-being
punishment
and moral character 139–41
theories/goals 141–4
punitive damages 109–10
QALYs (quality-adjusted life years) 386, 388–9
QMR (qualified majority rule) 500–1
race, and criminal justice 131–2
racial bias, in legal system 130–3
random assignments 38
rapport, and negotiation 129
rational actor model 295
rational reconstruction 295
rational wealth maximization 147
RCTs (randomized controlled trials) 38
RD (regression discontinuity) 44–7, 49
Reagan, President Ronald 363, 375, 376, 384
reasonable foresight doctrine 16
reasonably prudent person liability 93
reciprocity of causation 296
reduced form econometric studies 33
regulatory takings law 16
related hindsight bias 110
rescue law 432–3
Restatement of Contracts 428
restorative justice goals 141
RIA (Regulatory Impact Analyses) 363
risk aversion 349
risk estimation, availability heuristic in 67–8
Rule 12(b)(6) motions 53–5
Rule of Four 223, 224
(p. 533) rule utilitarianism 291
rules
and constraints on individuals 275
decomposability of 274–5
givenness of 280
and wealth maximization 281
Rules Enabling Act 53
Sarkozy, President Nicolas 395
satisficing option 62
scaled observation 82–3
scaling up approach 45
Scitovsky Paradox 290
Scitovsky reversals 365, 368–70
SDS (Social Decision Schemes) model 127
self-regulation 64–5
self-serving bias 86, 108
semiotics 305–6
sentencing guidelines 63–4
sequential accidents 15
settlement bargaining
asymmetric information hypothesis 86–7
in experimental economics 85–7
settlement biases 108–11
settlement failure model 85
settlement inefficiencies 86
Skidmore doctrine 226, 236
SMR (simple majority rule) 496, 497, 499, 502, 504, 505
SOC (Social Opportunity Cost of Capital) 371–3
Social Judgement Scheme 128
social norms
changing 468–70
conforming with 465–7
convention 465–6
and cooperation 473–4
coordination equilibrium 465–7, 468–9
countervailing effects 474–7
crowding out/in 473–4, 477
efficiency of 467–8
empirical expectation 466
expressive function of the law 470–3, 477
fairness of 467–8
imperative theory of law 466
internalization 465–7
and law 464–78
legal backlash 474–7
and legitimacy 473, 476
non-legal sanctions 465–7
norm entrepreneurs 468–9
path-dependency 467–8
preference change 472–3
sanctions 471–2, 477
social meaning 471–2
and state laws 470–7
sticky norm problem 475
and welfare maximization 478
zero sanction 476
social optimum 255
social psychology
apologies and remorse 138–9
assumptions 124–5
blame 137–45
coherence-based reasoning 126
confession and judges/juries 136–7
contract law 147–8
employment discrimination 133
interrogation 133–6
interrogation, and lie detection 133–4
interrogations, and confession 134–6
juror decision-making 126
jury decision-making 127–8
and law 124–48
mental state and punishment 141–4
moral character and punishment 139–41
moral reasoning and motivation 144–5
moral reasoning and punishment 141–4
morality 137–45
negotiation 128–30
pre-deliberation preference 127
property law 145–7
punishment 137–45
race and criminal justice 131–2
substantive law 145–8
soda law (New York) 61, 65–6
SPC (Shadow Price Capital) 371
spontaneous processes 272
Spur Industries v. Del E. Webb Development Co. 425, 432
stare decisis doctrine 306
statistical inference 52
statistical significance testing 107
status-quo bias 64
(p. 534) statutary interpretation 226
statutory interpretation 198
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change 372
Stiglitz Commission 395, 396, 397
STP (Social rate of Time Preference) 371
structural econometric studies 33
substantial similarity, in copyright 117
SWB (subjective well-being) 381–98
affective forecasting errors 386
agency and benefits 385
CBA (cost-benefit analysis) 384–93
cost-benefit-weighting principle 386
decision utility 382
DRM (day reconstruction method) 383, 397
ESM (experience sampling method) 382–3, 397
happiness data as prices 388–90
happiness-based alternatives to GDP 394–7
HLE (Happy Life Expectancy) 394, 397
IAH (Inequality-Adjusted Happiness) 396, 397
life satisfaction survey 383
national well-being 394
QALYs (quality-adjusted life years) 386, 388–9
SWB data 382–4
SWF (social welfare function) 391
U-Index 395–6
WBA (well-being analysis) 382, 384–93, 397, 398
WBU (well-being units) 386
SWF (social welfare function) 391
tags 344–5
tax substitution argument 321, 323–40, 341
behavioural response in labor earnings 330–1
differential commodity taxation 325–6
distortion counting 335
double distortion argument 334–6
empirical agnosticism 332
externality correction inclusive of legal rules 326–7
full tax substitution assumption 330
indicator goods 340
information role 332–3
informational problem 329–30
informational program 328
labor productivity 337–8
legal rules 346
lump sum tax types 326
and mechanical equivalence 333–4
missing third margin 334–6
optimal labor earnings taxation 338
Pigovian taxation 327, 329
policy X adjustments and labor earnings 334, 344
policy X, inefficient distributionally motivated adjustment to 324–5
policy X in literature 325–7
policy X revenue price of redistribution 342–3
potential misperceptions 331–40
private law rules 327
problematic descriptions of 334–6
prohibitory regulations 326–7
public goods and government programs 327
single-individual illustrations 336
tax substitution assumption 323–4, 324–31, 336–40
theoretical versatility 332
“theory of the second best” problem 328, 330
utility-equivalent lump sum scheme 325, 327, 329, 330, 331
weak separability of leisure 337–40
within income group differences 338
“theory of the second best” problem 328, 330
threshold of behaviour 14
tie-breaking chairman rule 496
time, and jury awards 110
Topping v. Oshawa Street Railway 431
tort damages 109–11, 334
tort law, and moral philosophy 294–5
tort law biases 108–11
tort liability 13–15, 22, 92–4
TP (time preference) 371
treatment effect 46
Truth in Lending Act 67
Twombly (Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly) 53–5
unanimity principle 252–4
uncertainty aversion 349
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act (1995) 36466 363–4
unilateral care model 14
United States Constitution
First Amendment 229
Commerce Clause 229
and interest groups 215
and minorities 188–9
and Philadelphia Convention 215
Presentment Clause 223
Separation of Powers Clause 224
United Verde Extension Mining v. Ralston 431
unity of law 17
Universal Darwinism 161–2
U.S. v. Carroll Towing Co. 13
The Use of Knowledge in Society 273
utilitarianism 291
utility individualism 255
value-driven behavior
deterrent effects 403–4
engagement goal 413–16
and law 402–16
legal authority 402–5
legal system goals 412–13
and legitimacy 406–11, 413–14
and moral values 409–11
normative alignment 415–16
organizational incentives 404
and punishment 403–4, 412
and self-regulation 410–11
target behaviors 415
value-based motivation 405–6, 411–12, 416
values 405–6
veilonomics 205
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994) 49
virtue ethics 290–1
warrantless arrests 146
WBA (well-being analysis) 382, 384–93, 397, 398
WBU (well-being units) 386
wealth effects 292
wealth maximization 147, 259–62, 281, 290, 291–2, 293, 300–3, 308, 366
wealth of Nations 258
welfare economics 293–4
well-being, and public policy 381–98
Why People Obey the Law 412
within income group differences 338
WMR (weighted majority rule) 496, 499, 501–2, 503
WQMR (weighted qualified majority rule) 501
WTA (willingness to accept) 358–9, 365, 367
WTP (willingness to pay) 358–9, 362, 365, 381, 391