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date: 21 November 2018

Abstract and Keywords

Issues related to collective decision making and to Condorcet jury theorems have been studied and publicly discussed for over two hundred years. Recently, there is a burgeoning interest in the topic by academicians as well as practitioners in the fields of Law, Economics, Political Science, and Psychology. Typical questions are: What is the optimal size of a panel of decision makers such as a jury, a political committee, or a board of directors? Which decision rule to utilize? Who should be the members of the team, representatives or professionals? What is the effect of strategic behaviour, group dynamics, conflict of interests, free riding, social interactions, and personal interdependencies on the final collective decision? This article presents current thinking in the field, offers suggestions for further research, and alludes to possible future developments regarding public choice and collective decision making.

Keywords: collective decisions, Condorcet jury theorems, decision rules, strategic behavior, free-riding, personal interdependencies

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