Abstract and Keywords
Mechanism design is the game theoretic jargon for institutional design and the even older tradition (in German) of ‘Ordnungspolitik’ (institutional design policy). When implementing institutions or mechanisms (or simply rules of conduct) such regulation should usually be codified by complementing the law appropriately. This article first derives and discusses legal rules as traditionally justified and implemented legally. This is then confronted with game theoretic mechanism design, relying on Dominance Solvability or the Revelation Principle. It is argued that the Revelation Principle is very useful for welfaristic or, more generally, consequentialistic explorations of what is attainable but offers no practical basis for legal mechanism design due to its unrealistic common knowledge restrictions.
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