- About the Contributors
- Formal Models of Legislatures
- The Sociology of Legislators and Legislatures
- Typologies and Classifications
- Roll-Call Analysis and the Study of Legislatures
- Words as Data: Content Analysis in Legislative Studies
- Debate and Deliberation in Legislatures
- Interviews and Surveys in Legislative Research
- The Experimental Study of Legislative Behaviour
- Candidate Selection: Implications and Challenges for Legislative Behaviour
- The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Legislative Behaviour
- Gender and Legislatures
- Roles in Legislatures
- Legislative Careers
- Procedure and Rules in Legislatures
- The Politics of Bicameralism
- Political Parties and Legislators
- Party Discipline
- Legislative Party Switching
- Legislative Institutions and Coalition Government
- Institutional Foundations of Legislative Agenda-Setting
- Legislatures and Public Finance
- Legislatures, Lobbying, and Interest Groups
- Legislatures and Foreign Policy
- Common Agency? Legislatures and Bureaucracies
- Political Behaviour in the European Parliament
- Sub-National Legislatures
- The Study of Legislatures in Latin America
- Legislatures in Central and Eastern Europe
- Authoritarian Legislatures
- Reluctant Democrats and Their Legislatures
- Name Index
- Subject Index
Abstract and Keywords
The behavior of (would-be) legislators between elections is shaped by electoral institutions. Legislators are expected to seek re-election and thus will do the things in the legislative arena that they believe voters will reward in the next election and avoid those that voters will not reward. To determine whom to vote for during elections, voters rely on a combination of party-based and candidate-based information shortcuts under different electoral institutions. The options available to voters are structured by electoral institutions, which may affect whether legislators will cultivate their personal reputation or the party reputation. This chapterexamines the ways electoral institutions affect legislative behavior. More specifically, it looks at the causal mechanism responsible for generating the incentives for voters, political parties, and individual legislators, as well as the manner in which the formal properties of the electoral institutions translate into conflicting incentives. Moreover, it discusses how individual legislators choose between the multiple behavioral repertoires that are commonly called personal vote-seeking. Finally, it describes the monitoring and sanctioning abilities of both voters and political parties.
Audrey André is Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science, Universiteit Antwerpen.
Sam Depauw is Assistant Professor and Post-Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Political Science, Vrije Universiteit Brussel.
Matthew Søberg Shugart is Professor of Political Science and at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego.
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